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Executive defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation are known as 
“inside debt”. The reason is that their values depend on the ability of the firm to 
make future payments to its participant employees. Such plans have the potential 
of mitigating the risk-shifting problem of managers (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) 
because executives who own inside debt are worried about firm default risk and 
not only about shareholder return.  In this dissertation, I examine the determinants 
of CEO inside debt and its components. I then use the inside debt as a measure of 
CEO risk preferences and examine its relation to firms’ risk.  
In Chapter one, I use the new SEC disclosure rule of 2006 to examine the 
determinants of CEO inside debt. I find that CEOs defer a larger fraction of their 
compensation when their cash compensation is high, firm liquidity is high, firm 
default risk is low, and when executive personal wealth is high. These findings are 
consistent with CEOs choosing to defer compensation when they least need the 
money and when they do not expect the firm to default. In contrast to previous 
studies, I find a non-linear inverted U-shape relation between firm leverage and 
CEO inside debt. In particular, CEOs reduce their inside-debt when the firm is 
highly levered.  
 Using novel data from executive deferred compensation, Chapter two presents 
new evidence on the relationship between CEO risk preference and firm risk (the 
volatility of firm performance measures such as stock return, earnings and operating 
cash flows). My results show a negative association between the CEO risk aversion 
(as measured by realized performance on inside debt) and the volatility of firm market 
performance: Firms with risk-averse CEOs have experience less stock price volatility. 
I also find that firms providing deferred compensation plans have lower performance 
volatility. The results contribute to the inside debt literature by showing that  inside 
debt compensation is related to lower firm risk and lower firm market value. 
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CHAPTER 1  
THE DETERMINANTS OF CEO INSIDE DEBT AND ITS COMPONENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Executive defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation are known as “inside 
debt”. The reason is that their values depend on the ability of the firm to make future 
payments to its participant employees. Such plans have the potential of mitigating the 
risk-shifting problem of managers (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) because executives 
who own inside debt are worried about firm default risk and not only about 
shareholder return.  Recent theoretical work by Edmans and Liu (2010) demonstrates 
that inside debt is potentially an efficient remedy to the asset substitution problem. 
In a seminal study, Sundaram and Yermack (2006) find support for the role of 
inside debt in mitigating the agency problem. Sundaram and Yermack use the pension 
value of 237 large firms during the period of 1996-2002 as a proxy of inside debt to 
examine the determinants of inside debt and its relation with CEO turnover and firm 
default risk. They find that pension values are higher when firm leverage is higher, 
and CEOs tend to take conservative investment policies when their personal debt-to-
equity ratio is higher than the firm leverage ratio. Their interpretation is that the 
probability of the firm defaulting on its external debt is reduced when the managers 
hold large inside debt positions. 
The proxy of inside debt in Sundaram and Yermack (2006) is the pension 
obligations to the CEO. Unfortunately, due to data availability, they could not account 
for another significant component of inside debt—deferred compensation plans. This 
study expands Sundaram and Yermack’s work by examining both pension obligations 
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and deferred compensation plans. 
At the end of 2006, the SEC issued new requirements for additional disclosure of 
executive compensation. According to the new disclosure rule, firms are required to 
disclose the accumulated actuarial present value of each executive officer’s pension 
plan, as well as the contributions, earnings, and balances of each executive officer’s 
nonqualified deferred compensation account after fiscal year 2006.  
This study documents the new disclosed information of CEOs’ inside debt and 
examines its determinants and implications to agency theory. Using new disclosed 
information, I find that deferred compensation is in the same order of magnitude as 
pension. The average deferred compensation represents about 6.2% of a CEO’s total 
compensation, whereas pension contribution represents about 5.5% of overall CEO 
compensation. In addition, the univariate and regression analysis in this study point to 
a nonlinear association between firm leverage and CEO inside debt. I find an inverted 
U-shape quadratic relation: CEOs whose firms are in the middle range of leverage 
have higher inside debt holdings than their counterparts in both low-leverage firms 
and high-leverage firms. In other words, inside debt initially increases with the firm 
leverage, but when firm leverage reaches a certain level, CEO inside debt holdings are 
negatively associated with the firm leverage. This finding casts doubt on previous 
findings and suggests that there are other reasons that affect inside debt use. Thus, 
potential explanations of these results are tested to understand the quadratic relation. 
The investigation shows that the underlying reason may relate to firm financial 
distress and CEO risk aversion. 
  3 
The inverted U-shape relation is quite robust. It exists when the quadratic model 
is applied on the pension, total inside debt, the CEO’s leverage ratio and the firm 
match rate for the CEO’s deferred compensation. The only exception is the CEO’s 
total deferred compensation. No association between the firm leverage and CEOs’ 
deferred compensation is found, neither linear nor quadratic. 
I further on investigate the determinants of deferred compensation by examining 
how CEOs determine their contributions to deferred compensation every year. I find 
that firm size, financial liquidity status, default risk, and CEO personal wealth are the 
main factors that affect the amount of or ratio of contribution to CEOs’ deferred 
compensation account. Dynamic regression results show that the changes of CEOs’ 
contribution to the deferred compensation plan are negatively associated with CEO 
wealth changes and return on deferred compensation investment. These results suggest 
that CEOs use the deferred compensation as both an income tax instrument and an 
investment instrument. 
The above results are robust even after accounting for the endogeneity of firm 
leverage. 
The results of this paper also shed light on how CEO power and board 
monitoring efficiency affects the inside debt compensations. I use executive tenure 
and CEO-chair duality to measure CEO power, and I use board size and independence 
to measure board efficiency. I find a positive association between the inside debt and 
CEO power and a negative association with board efficiency. These results may 
support the view that inside debt can be used by managers to extract additional rents as 
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suggested by Gerakos (2007). 
This study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it documents 
the use of deferred compensation in large public U.S. firms. Previous studies were not 
able to examine this component of compensation due to the lack of data. Second, it 
shows a non-linear relation between firm leverage and executive inside debt holding, 
which suggests that inside debt plays a more complex role than that proposed by 
Sundaram and Yermack in mitigating the asset substitution problem. Third, it provides 
supportive evidence of the arguments that inside debt can be used to extract additional 
rents. 
This research adds to a number of new studies which examine the use of inside 
debt in executive compensations. Sundaram and Yermack (2006) and Gerakos (2007, 
2008) are cross-sectional studies of inside debt’s role in management compensation; 
Wei and Yermack (2010) is an event study of the announcement valuation effect of 
inside debt disclosure. In particular, Wei and Yermack’s (2010) event study supports 
Sundaram and Yermack (2006) argument that firms use deferred compensations to 
reduce the potential agency costs of debt implicit in their capital structures. Unlike 
these four studies, I use the new information from the SEC disclosure rule on inside 
debt and find that the role of inside side is more complicated than what the previous 
studies have demonstrated. 
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows: Section 2 is the 
literature review of related research. Section 3 contains the introduction and 
documentation of newly disclosed executive deferred compensation. Section 4 
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describes the data, variables, and discussion of univariate analysis. Section 5 shows 
the results of regression analysis and provides accompanying discussion. Section 6 is 
the conclusion. 
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2 LITERITURE REVIEW  
Existing theories on managerial compensation and agency problems make a great 
effort to explain and support the use of equity-like instruments in executive 
compensation packages. Since the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
which theorizes the agency costs of debt, few theoretical and empirical studies have 
been performed that discuss the role of debt instruments in management compensation. 
The new disclosure rule and Sundaram and Yermack’s 2006 work draw the attention 
of public and financial economists to debt-like instruments such as pension and 
deferred compensation. Edmans and Liu (2010) is one of the few studies that attempt 
to build a theoretical framework to explain the findings in Sundaram and Yermack 
(2006) and exploit the empirical implications of debt-like instrument in executive 
compensation practice. 
In corporate finance, there are two main types of agency problems: 
(1) stockholder-bondholder conflicts, and (2) manager-stockholder conflicts. In the 
first type, the agent is the manager, who is assumed to be perfectly aligned with 
stockholders, and the principal is the bondholders. In the second, managers again are 
the agent, but this time work in their own best interests and the principal is the 
stockholders. 
Based on the agency theory beginning with Jensen and Meckling (1976), a firm’s 
capital structure is one of the instruments used to reduce agency cost so that the capital 
structure affects the management compensation structure. Jensen and Meckling argue 
that both outside equity and outside debt finance create an agency problem: either a 
  7 
moral hazard problem or a risk-shifting problem. They conjecture that wage 
compensation plus non-pecuniary benefits are sufficient to alleviate the agency 
problem. They do not incorporate the debt-like instruments into the manager’s 
compensation. But the researchers do note that having managers hold a fraction of the 
total debt equal to their fraction of the total equity eliminates their incentive to 
reallocate wealth from debt holders to stockholders. 
Jensen and Meckling’s framework explains capital structure in terms of the 
incentive implications of return patterns associated with different mixes of instruments 
for outside finance. They did not incorporate any control rights. Dewatripont and 
Tirole (1994) describe a model in which multiple outside investors hold diverse 
securities (outside debt and outside equity) and debt holders are in control in bad states 
and equity holders are in control in good states. In the Dewatripont-Tirole model, the 
optimal contract ties managerial compensation to equity value rather than to firm 
value. However, debt is still not a part of the compensation package. 
Other theoretic works, such as Brander and Poitevin (1992), Hirshleifer and 
Thakor (1992) and John and John (1993), proposed certain instruments that can 
alleviate the agency costs of debt. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) show that managerial 
reputation can prevent risk shifting problem. John and John (1993) propose two 
solutions to avoid risk-shifting: solvency-contingent bonuses and reduction of the 
manager’s equity. Brander and Poitevin (1992) show that the bonus contract is an 
optimal contract, since through suitable choice of the target, it leads to the ex ante best 
outcome, maximizing the firm value. They present a general fixed bonus that may be 
contractually triggered at states other than solvency. Since these works seek to show 
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the effectiveness of their proposed solutions with regard to alleviating the agency costs 
of debt, they do not consider whether alternative mechanisms such as inside debt 
would be optimal or superior. No work discussed the optimality of the manager 
holding debt in executive compensation contract until Edmans and Liu (2010).  
Edmans and Liu (2010) incorporate a set of standard securities—debt, equity and 
a fixed bonus—into a new executive compensation model. They demonstrate that 
inside debt can address the problem of the agency cost of debt and that it can do even 
better than the bonuses. Moreover, they show that inside debt could be a part of 
optimal compensation even when debt creditors’ concerns are not only the risk of 
default but also the recovery value in default. The latter makes the inside debt a part of 
optimal compensation since inside debt not only reduces the possibility of bankruptcy 
but also keeps the highest payoff in bankruptcy while the other compensation 
instruments do not have this function. More generally, their model suggests that inside 
debt may be more superior to inside equity in firms with higher leverage in which risk-
shifting problems may be more severe. 
Even fewer empirical studies have been made concerning the role of inside debt 
in top executives’ compensation. Previous works use the executive pension as a full 
proxy of inside debt due to the limited disclosure of deferred compensation. Sundaram 
and Yermack (2006) take the first step of studying the role of inside debt in top 
management compensation. They use CEO pension plan data in 237 SP500 firms to 
study the determinants of deferred compensation and how inside debt affects CEO 
turnover and a firm’s risk of bankruptcy. They find evidence that CEO compensation 
exhibits a balance between debt and equity incentives, which is consistent with the 
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Jenson and Meckling’s (1976) conjecture. Their findings of a positive relation 
between firm leverage and pension also support and prediction of Edmans and Liu 
(2010). However, the Sundaram and Yermack study is restricted by the data 
availability of another important part of inside debt: deferred compensation. In their 
paper, they argue that deferred compensation is usually “far less than the value of 
pensions, so the omission of deferred compensation…may not be serious.” In my 
paper, however, I show that the value of deferred compensation is about the same size 
as pensions and that the incorporation of deferred compensation in the measure of 
inside debt will substantially affect the implications of inside debt in agency problems 
and in the CEO compensation discussion.  
Wei and Yermack (2009) study the announcement effect of the disclosure of 
inside debt on stock and bond valuation. In their paper, they incorporate the deferred 
compensation into the definition of inside debt to show how the information of CEO 
inside debt holdings affects investors’ valuation decision on the date that CEO inside 
debt is first disclosed. They find that when new disclosure rules took effect in early 
2007, bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the volatility of both securities drops 
upon disclosures for firms whose CEOs have significant inside debt holdings. They 
conclude that a CEO’s inside debt holding may reduce the firm’s risk and transfer 
value from equity holders to debt holders. Their findings are consistent with the results 
of Sundaram and Yermack (2006) in that firms use deferred compensation to reduce 
the potential agency costs of debt implicit in their capital structures. 
A great deal of the literature related to my work is from taxation, law and labor 
economics. Much of the literature concerns the taxation role of pension for firms and 
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discusses the law and economic implication of why companies provide pension plans 
(Such as Sharpe (1976); Black (1980); Petersen (1992); Sunarensan and Zapatero 
(1997); Rauh (2009)). However, this literature focuses on the pension plans of workers 
or general salaried employees, and many of the conclusions of the literature may not 
apply for executive pensions for two reasons. First, the majority of CEO pension in the 
inside debt discussion is non-qualified for tax purposes, meaning that it is not required 
to follow the requirements of Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") or the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). Second, CEOs are not only the 
participants in pension plans, but they may have the power to administrate them. 
Therefore, both the impact that pensions have on CEOs and CEOs’ response to 
pension plans may differ substantially from those of regular workers. 
Another recent empirical work focusing on CEO pension is Gerakos (2007). 
Gerakos mainly tests the two arguments on the CEO pension problem: managerial 
power and optimal contracting. The managerial power view argues that CEO pensions 
are just a channel of rent extraction for managers under their entrenched managerial 
power. The optimal contracting view argues that CEO pensions are a tax-motivated 
optimal compensation contract that aligns manger interests with those of investors and 
reduces the agency costs. Gerakos finds supportive evidence for both views: optical 
contracting variables primarily determine the pension benefit levels while CEOs with 
stronger managerial power tend to receive higher pension benefits. Similar to 
Sundaram and Yermack (2006), however, Gerakos study does not incorporate the 
deferred compensation into the compensation of individual managers. 
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3 EXECUTIVE DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
Although not used by all companies, pension benefits and deferred compensation are 
the two main components of inside debt. Sundaram and Yermack is the best source for 
CEO pension documentation. This paper is the first literature to document executive 
deferred compensation since the information has become publicly available.  
Broadly speaking, the CEO pension benefit is just one type of deferred 
compensation. To avoid confusion with Sundaram and Yermack’s discussion, I restrict 
my definition of deferred compensation to non-qualified deferred compensation in this 
study. 
Unlike pension benefits, which usually accrue to employees under company-wide 
formulas established by each company, and which are based upon years of service and 
employees’ average level of cash compensation, deferred compensation accrues if the 
executive agrees to have part of his or her current compensation (e.g., as regular salary, 
bonuses or any other type of compensation) withheld by the company, and given to 
him or her at some pre-specified date in the future (e.g., when he or she separates from 
service, attains normal retirement age, encounters unforeseeable financial hardship, 
becomes disabled, dies). As an incentive, firms usually match CEOs’ contribution to 
deferred compensation with some contracted match rate. Deferred compensation is 
generally paid out to the executive at retirement although earlier withdrawals are 
permitted by some firms under certain limited circumstances. Deferred compensation 
is often invested either at a fixed rate of return, in the company’s stock or in a menu of 
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stock or bond mutual funds chosen by the firm. Many companies allow managers to 
make frequent changes as to how their deferred compensation is invested (bi-weekly 
or weekly), though these investment decisions are not observable under current 
disclosure rules.  
In addition to the incentive implications, a major motivation for executives to 
defer their compensation is that its taxation is almost always deferred until the 
executive receives actual payouts. On the other hand, for both pension benefits and 
deferred compensation balances, the amounts due to executives are almost always left 
unfunded and unsecured in order to preserve these tax benefits; these sums are at risk 
like other unsecured debt if the firm becomes financially distressed. 
3.2 DISCLOSURE OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 
Before the SEC’s new disclosure rules in 2006, firms were not required to disclose the 
information on executive deferred compensation, and the disclosures on executive 
pension plans were not well prescribed. The July 2006 amendments to executive 
compensation rules require that companies prepare a thorough discussion and analysis 
of compensation, broaden the scope of required narratives, and provide additional 
quantitative compensation information. Following the compensation discussion and 
analysis section of a firm’s proxy statement, one of the new rules requires the 
disclosure of retirement and other post-employment compensation. These required 
disclosures are to include tabular disclosure of the actuarial present value of each 
executive officer’s accumulated pension plan as well as of the contributions, earnings 
and balances of each executive officer’s nonqualified deferred compensation account.  
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In firms’ proxy statements or other SEC filings, deferred compensation plans for 
CEOs are usually called non-qualified deferred compensation plans (DCPs hereafter). 
That a plan is “non-qualified” here means that it is not required to meet the tax law 
requirements applicable to “qualified” plans (such as ordinary tax-qualified pension 
plans) under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) or to restrictions under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). However, non-qualified DCPs are required 
to meet the requirements of IRC section 409A after year 2005, which section was 
created, in response to Enron’s demise, to eliminate the ability of an employee to 
access their DCP early in exchange for a penalty. Under non-qualified compensation 
plans, employees are not taxed on deferred compensation until those compensations 
are actually received, at which time the employer is entitled to an income tax 
deduction of that amount.  
Because non-qualified deferred compensation plans are not subject to the 
complex rules imposed on qualified retirement plans, they can be established for one 
individual employee or for a number of individuals selected at the complete discretion 
of the employer (for example, a plan for the named executive officers of the company). 
Employers are free to select which employees are eligible to participate, which 
conditions are to be met, and which method will be used to determine the amount of 
benefits to be paid. As a result, such plans offer an employer a unique opportunity to 
provide a benefit which can be customized to meet its particular objectives. 
Although they can be ensured with insurance contracts as long as the premiums 
are paid by the employer, most DCPs are unfunded and unsecured in order to be 
exempt from a majority of the provisions of ERISA.  
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3.3 TYPES OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 
Unfunded DCP plans may be categorized into two groups on the basis the structure of 
the plan, elective and non-elective, which are listed in proxy statements in Non-
Qualified Deferred Compensation and Pension Benefits respectively. 
An elective DCP, which is the primary focus of this paper, is one under which the 
employee selects to receive less salary and bonus compensation than he or she would 
otherwise currently receive and to defer the reduced amount to a future date. The 
election is contained in a written agreement that specifies the amount or percentage of 
salary, bonus, or other deferrals and the time and method of payout distribution. 
Usually the election to defer income is made prior to the time the income is earned. 
Since the employee initiates the deferral of the income that he or she would otherwise 
be currently received, therefore, an elective deferral will usually be fully vested and 
payable in the situation of termination of employment for practically any reason.  
On the other hand, a non-elective DCP provides a deferred compensation benefit 
in the form of a salary continuation agreement as a reward for valuable key employees. 
Under a non-elective DCP, the employer makes a legally obligatory agreement to pay 
supplemental compensation (in addition to regular salary and bonus), usually upon 
retirement. Because of its non-qualified characteristics, the company can make 
unlimited annual contributions to a non-elective DCP. This kind of plan is often called 
a supplemental employee retirement plan, or SERP. SERPs are frequently designed 
either as a standalone plan or paired with a qualified pension plan. SERPs are covered 
under the definition of CEO pension in Sundaram and Yermack and are excluded from 
the definition of non-qualified deferred compensation in this paper. 
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3.4 RELATED COMMON QUESTIONS  
Since the deferred compensation plans were was not well exposed to the public, 
people may have some questions regarding the characteristics and functions of 
deferred compensation plans. Here I list and answer some of the most common 
questions such as: What is the difference between qualified and non-qualified 
retirement plans? What are the advantages of non-qualified retirement plans? What are 
the disadvantages of deferred compensation plan? How are DCPs invested and 
operated? 
3.4.1 The Difference between Qualified and Non-Qualified Retirement Plans 
A plan that meets the requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 401(a) and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and is qualified for 
favorable tax treatment is called a qualified retirement plan. These plans offer a 
number of tax benefits. For instance, they allow employers to deduct annual allowable 
contributions for each participant, and contributions and earnings on those 
contributions are tax-deferred until withdrawn for each participant.  
In contrast, a non-qualified retirement plan is a plan that does not meet the IRS 
401(a) or ERISA requirements and consequently does not qualify for some of the 
favorable income tax treatment benefits afforded qualified retirement plans, nor do 
they qualify for the employee protection provisions of ERISA. 
3.4.2 The Advantages of Non-Qualified Retirement Plans 
Even though non-qualified DCPs do not have favorable income tax treatment, they are 
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not subject to the requirements of ERISA and IRS. This is in fact the primary 
advantage of non-qualified DCPs. Non-qualified DCPs offer an opportunity for 
employers to make additional compensation (such as non-elective DCPs). And 
employers can customize the plans to meet specific needs. For instance, employers can 
align employees’ goals with the company’s long-term performance. Further, 
employers with temporary cash flow problems can offer greater deferred 
compensation packages to retain key employees. Deferred compensation plans can 
also enhance the financial statement by keeping the plan assets on the balance sheet 
while helping to reduce corporate exposure to accumulated earnings taxes. 
On the other hand, employees can benefit from deferred compensation plans. For 
instance, employees who have high current compensations and higher current personal 
income tax rates could defer income until later when they would probably pay lower 
taxes. The plan can also help the employee to avoid penalty taxes on premature or 
tardy withdrawals, which may be imposed on qualified retirement benefits. In recent 
years, however, the advent of lower tax rates and IRC section 409A requirements have 
in some cases mitigated these traditional income tax advantages. But employees may 
still wish to lower their current income for reasons such as financial aid eligibility or 
planning for a forthcoming leave of absence. 
3.4.3 The Disadvantages of Deferred Compensation Plans 
There is no any disadvantage for employers who have a DCP. For employees, the 
drawback of a non-qualified compensation plan is that it keeps him or her from 
immediately receiving a full compensation package. Moreover, if the plan is invested 
in company stock and there is a correction in the market, the participant may lose 
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money even if he or she met all performance targets. Being part of a non-qualified 
deferred compensation plan also ties an employee to a company she may not want to 
be a part of long-term.  
3.4.4 The Investment and Operation of DCPs 
Most DCPs offer either a fixed rate of return on deferred compensation or the ability 
to invest in a limited number of mutual funds. Participant accounts in a DCP are 
referred to as hypothetical investments because they are only a measure of the amount 
owed the participant. The participant’s account will be credited with gains or losses 
based upon the activity of the hypothetical investments. In general, the employee may 
express a preference for investments, but the employer cannot be obligated to invest 
according to the employee’s preferences. In fact, the employers are not obligated to 
invest the contributions at all. In other words, the participant accounts will accumulate 
as if their contributions were invested in those preferences through a phantom or 
hypothetical investment account, and the employer is free to invest the deferrals.  
In terms of the investment return of DCP, for sophisticated investors the returns 
earned inside the DCP plan may fall well short of the returns they generate outside the 
plan due to the unavailability of private equity and hedge fund investments inside the 
DCP. However the DCP investment might benefit from the tax-deferred accumulation 
of contributions if one assumes they enjoy the same return rates as the investment 
options outside the plan. 
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4 DATA AND VARIABLES 
4.1 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
While executive compensation disclosures have been required since 1933, inside debt 
values were almost never disclosed before SEC’s new disclosure rule in 2006. Prior 
2006, firms were not required to report their executive deferred compensation plans, 
hence the deferred compensation balances held by individual managers were not 
observable. Firms were required to provide certain details about the pension benefits 
but the expected present value of an individual manager’s pension was not given; 
therefore, it was very complicate to estimate its value ( See Sundaram and Yermack 
(2006) for the estimation method). In July 2006, the SEC adopted new rules on 
executive compensations, one of which required companies to disclose and describe 
the retirement plans, deferred compensation and other post-employment payments and 
benefits. The present market values of these compensations are also required to be 
reported. The new disclosure rule of pensions and deferred compensation makes it 
possible to test the theory of inside debt and study its empirical implications. 
 Research sample for this study comes from COMPUSTAT Executive 
Compensation database from year 2006 to 2008. The universe of firms covers the S&P 
1500 plus companies that were part of the S&P 1500 and are still trading. Firms 
without accounting data in COMPUSTAT or stock return data in CRSP are eliminated. 
This results in a sample of 1947 firms. Among these 1947 firms, 480 firms are from 
SP500 large-cap firms, 378 firms are from SP400 middle-cap firms and 571 firms are 
from SP600 small-cap firms. The other 518 firms were the once SP1500 firms (see 
Figure 1). 
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FIGURE 1: Sample Distribution 
Figure 1: Sample Distribution. Among 1947 sample firms, 480 firms are from SP500 large-cap 
firms, 378 firms are from SP400 middle-cap firms and 571 firms are from SP600 small-cap firms. 
The other 518 firms were the once SP1500 firms. 
Two main variables are obtained directly from Executive Compensation database 
(PENSION_VALUE_TOT and DEFER_BALANCE_TOT). The Total Pension Value 
(PENSION_VALUE_TOT) is the aggregate actuarial present value of the executive’s 
accumulated benefit under the company’s pension plans at the end of fiscal year and 
the Total Deferred Compensation Balance (DEFER_BALANCE_TOT) is the 
aggregate balance in non-tax-qualified deferred compensation plans at the end of fiscal 
year. All equity-based compensation arrangements in pension value and deferred 
compensation balance are estimated by fair value, which is the market value of the 
arrangement when it is reported. Total inside debt is the sum of pensions and deferred 
compensations. 
Table 1 and Table 2 present the basic descriptive statistics of the data.  
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics of CEO Related Variables 
 Mean Std Dev 25th%ile Median 75th%ile 
Age 55.12 7.22 50 55 60 
Tenure 6.84 6.89 2 5 9 
Pension value(mm.) 2.65 6.50 0 0 2.32 
Deferred compensation(mm.) 2.28 8.93 0 0.09 1.48 
Inside debt value(mm.) 4.99 12.31 0 0.68 4.83 
Equity value(mm.) 227.62 6755.84 3.08 11.02 36.36 
Inside debt / equity value 0.430 1.049 0 0.059 0.380 
Inside debt /(inside debt + equity value) 0.178 0.241 0 0.061 0.288 
Leverage indicator 0.348     
Annual Salary + Bonus(mm.) 2.00 2.83 0.788 1.29 2.35 
Annual total compensation(mm.) 5.66 7.52 1.54 3.30 6.87 
Annual pension increment(mm.) 0.411 1.65 0 0 0.216 
Annual DCP increment(mm.) 0.356 2.839 0 0 0.143 
Annual firm contribution to DCP(mm.) 0.127 2.404 0 0 0.029 
Annual CEO contribution to DCP(mm.) 0.229 1.471 0 0 0.061 
Firm contribution/ CEO contribution 0.162 0.521 0 0 0 
Return on DCP (%) -0.061 13.726 0 0 4.357 
CEO percentage ownership 0.040 1.277 0.001 0.003 0.011 
CEO-Chairman duality 0.505 0.500 0 1 1 
CEO contribution/ (Salary+Bonus) 0.107 0.768 0 0 0.038 
Note: 
Descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO and firm characteristics for a sample of 1,947 
observations from S&P 1500 companies over 2006 to 2008.  Pension values are the aggregate 
actuarial present value of the executive's accumulated benefit under the company's pension plans at 
the end of fiscal year.  Deferred compensation values are the aggregate balance in non-tax-
qualified deferred compensation plans at the end of fiscal year. Inside debt values are the sum of 
pension and deferred compensation. Equity value equals the value of common stock plus stock 
options, calculated according to the reported market value at fiscal year end. Leverage indicator is 
an indicate variable is one if CEO inside debt/(inside debt+equity value) is higher than firm 
leverage and is zero otherwise. Data is from COMPUSTAT Execucomp. 
 
Table 1 indicates that the mean of the CEO equity values (229.62 millions) are 
far higher than the mean of the CEO inside debt holdings (4.99 millions). The data in 
Table 1 also indicates that the deferred compensations are significant parts of the over 
all CEO compensations. The mean ratios of total inside debt increment to total CEO 
compensation and deferred compensation to total CEO compensation are 11.7% and 
6.2%, respectively.  
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics Related Variables 
 Mean Std Dev 25th%ile Median 75th%ile 
Total assets(bn.) 17.25 100.35 0.65 1.99 6.96 
Total net sales(bn.) 6.48 20.23 0.53 1.47 4.61 
Equity market capitalization (bn.) 7.791 24.847 0.580 1.577 4.808 
Leverage (book value of equity) 0.180 0.187 0.017 0.145 0.279 
Leverage (market value of equity) 0.191 0.200 0.015 0.136 0.294 
Research & development / sales 0.067 0.734 0 0 0.029 
Capital expenditures/total assets 0.048 0.056 0.014 0.032 0.062 
Return on assets (EBITDA/total assets) 0.118 0.148 0.07 0.118 0.174 
Annual stock return 0.955 0.441 0.675 0.95 1.183 
Tax loss carry-forward indicator 0.428     
Negative operating income indicator 0.109     
Founder CEO indicator 0.177     
Years since date of founding 24.9 18.8 11 19 35 
Number of industry segments 3.58 2.09 2 3 5 
Board size 9.3 2.5 8 9 11 
Percent of outside directors 0.829 0.087 0.778 0.857 0.889 
Top 5 institutional investors ownership 0.294 0.928 0.233 0.291 0.351 
Note: 
Descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO and firm characteristics for a sample of 1,947 
observations from S&P 1500 companies over 2006 to 2008. Leverage equals total long-term dent 
divided by total debt plus the book value (or market value) of equity. Data is from COMPUSTAT 
Execucomp and the institutional ownership information is from the CDA/Spectrum database of 
13Fs. 
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Figure 2 shows that within the sample firms, about 52% firms do not offer CEO 
pension plans and 33% firms do not offer CEO deferred compensation plans.  
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7%Both Pension and
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No Pension or
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26%DCP only26%
 
FIGURE 2: Distribution of Firms with Pension Plan and DCPs 
Figure 2: Distribution of Firms with Pension Plan and DCPs. Within the sample firms, about 
52% firms do not offer CEO pension plans and 33% firms do not offer CEO deferred 
compensation plans. The percentage of firms with no pension or DCP is higher in small-cap firms 
than that in large-cap firms. Firm groups with higher leverages are more likely to provide CEO 
pensions and CEO deferred compensation plans, but this likelihood becomes lower for the group 
with the highest leverage. In addition, older firms and firms with less growth opportunities (using 
Tobin’s Q or R&D expenses/sales) are more likely to offer CEO pension and deferred 
compensation plans. 
Figure 3 further shows that, for CEOs in firms that offer pension plans and 
deferred compensation plans, about 11% CEOs do not choose pension plans and 16% 
CEOs do not choose deferred compensation plans (firm years with CEO turn over 
have been excluded). 
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FIGURE 3: Distributions of CEOs with Pension Plan and DCPs 
Figure 3: Distributions of CEOs with Pension Plan and DCPs. For CEOs in firms that offer 
pension plans and deferred compensation plans, about 11% CEOs do not have pension plans and 
16% CEOs do not have deferred compensation plans (firm years with CEO turn over have been 
excluded). 
 
Consistent with Sundaram and Yermack (2006), Table 3 shows that CEOs’ 
leverages increase with the firm size. While middle-cap firms and large-cap firms have 
similar firm leverages, larger firms have higher CEO leverages and large percentage of 
CEOs whose personal leverages are higher than firm leverage ratio. 
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TABLE 3: Mean Values of Related Variables, by Firm Size 
 SP600 SP400 SP500 
Total assets(bn.) 1.234 3.953 47.607 
Total net sales(bn.) 0.940 2.514 18.186 
Pension value(mm.) 0.729 2.146 5.782 
Deferred compensation(mm.) 0.564 2.358 4.831 
Inside debt value(mm.) 1.304 4.521 10.722 
Equity value(mm.) 22.528 67.476 730.892 
Inside debt /(inside debt + equity value) 0.135 0.158 0.215 
Inside debt / equity value 0.349 0.394 0.508 
Leverage indicator 0.305 0.358 0.429 
Annual Salary + Bonus(mm.) 1.104 1.777 3.623 
Annual total compensation(mm.) 2.379 4.712 11.143 
Annual pension increment(mm.) 0.125 0.386 0.891 
Annual DCP increment(mm.) 0.087 0.359 0.654 
Annual firm contribution to DCP(mm.) 0.031 0.123 0.127 
Annual CEO contribution to DCP(mm.) 0.056 0.236 0.527 
Leverage (book value of equity) 0.135 0.189 0.188 
Leverage (market value of equity) 0.148 0.190 0.182 
Firm match ratio of DCP 0.115 0.135 0.253 
CEO contribution/ (Salary+Bonus) 0.048 0.162 0.171 
Note: 
Descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO and firm characteristics for a sample of 1,947 
observations from S&P 1500 companies over 2006 to 2008. Data is from COMPUSTAT 
Execucomp. 
 
Both pension values and deferred compensation balances are sensitive to CEO 
ages due to the conditions of these plans. When looking at the association between 
CEO personal leverage and CEO age in Table 4, I find an inverted U-shape: CEOs 
personal leverages increase when CEOs grow older until the CEOs reach the age of 65, 
afterwards, the CEOs personal leverages decrease. 
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TABLE 4: Mean Values of Related Variables, by CEO Age 
 45- 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66+ 
Salary (mm.) 0.592 0.687 0.756 0.819 0.803 0.807 
Bonus (mm.) 0.147 0.287 0.293 0.339 0.274 0.870 
Stock awards (mm.) 1.167 1.462 1.695 1.806 1.649 0.965 
Option awards (mm.) 1.385 1.244 1.330 1.498 1.449 0.889 
Annual Salary+Bonus (mm.) 0.747 1.050 1.218 1.413 1.351 1.746 
Annual pension increment(mm.) 0.046 0.171 0.410 0.675 0.643 0.240 
Annual total compensation(mm.) 4.108 4.892 5.641 6.577 6.216 5.222 
Pension value(mm.) 0.210 0.793 2.283 4.037 4.301 2.764 
Deferred compensation(mm.) 1.439 1.716 1.920 2.991 3.101 1.934 
Inside debt value(mm.) 1.715 2.588 4.236 7.081 7.453 4.724 
Equity value(mm.) 31.85 35.13 38.26 39.03 62.94 112.9 
Inside debt /(inside debt + equity value) 0.069 0.126 0.164 0.237 0.199 0.130 
Leverage indicator 0.179 0.273 0.349 0.448 0.382 0.281 
Annual CEO contribution to DCP(mm.) 0.207 0.134 0.247 0.267 0.220 0.333 
CEO contribution/ (Salary+Bonus) 0.169 0.067 0.118 0.110 0.089 0.112 
Note: 
Descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO and firm characteristics for a sample of 1,947 
observations from S&P 1500 companies over 2006 to 2008. Data is from COMPUSTAT 
Execucomp. 
 
 This pattern is consistent with Sundaram and Yermack(2006)’s findings and 
suggests that not only pension values but also the total inside debt tend to increase 
more rapidly than the value of CEOs’ equity holdings as CEOs grow older when 
managers’ interest are aligned more closer with the interests of debt holders. The 
fraction of CEOs whose personal leverage is higher than the firm leverage also has an 
inversed U-shape relation with the CEO’s age (See Figure 4).  
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FIGURE 4: Average CEO Personal Leverage, by CEO Age 
Figure 4: Average CEO Personal Leverage, by CEO Age. CEOs personal leverages increase 
when CEOs grow older until the CEOs reach the age of 65, afterwards, the CEOs personal 
leverages decrease. The pension value, deferred compensation and overall total inside debt follow 
the same patterns as that of the CEO personal leverage ratio.  
The absolute value of pension value, deferred compensation and overall total 
inside debt follow the same inversed-U patterns as CEOs grow older (See Figure 5).  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Age
45-
Age
46-50
Age
51-55
Age
56-60
Age
61-65
Age
66+
Pension value(mm.)*5
Deferred
compensation(mm.)*5
Inside debt
value(mm.)*5
Equity value(mm.)
 
FIGURE 5: Average Inside Debt and Its Components, by CEO Age 
Figure 5: Average Inside Debt and Its Components, by CEO Age.  CEOs inside debt and its 
components show an inverted U-shape relation with CEO age: CEO inside debt increases when 
CEOs grow older until the CEOs reach the age of 65, afterwards, the CEOs inside debt decreases.  
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Meanwhile, contrasting with the equity value change, for the age group above 60 
years, CEOs’ average equity values jump from 39 million to 63 million, then to 113 
million for the group older than 65 years. Comparing to the other age groups whose 
equity values are varying between 50 and 100 million, this jump may suggest that for 
most CEOs might convert their inside debts to equities when their deferred 
compensation plans vest. 
I then study the relation between the CEO personal leverage and the firm 
leverage. Interestingly, the monotone relation in Sundaram and Yermack(2006) is not 
observed. Instead, I find an inverted U-shape relation: CEO’s personal leverage 
increases when the firm leverage (accounting value) becomes higher until the firm 
leverage reaches a point, then the CEO’s personal leverages decrease with the 
increasing level of the firm leverage(See Table 5 and Figure 6). Furthermore, by 
examining the association between the firms’ match rate and the firm leverage, I do 
not find the evidence that higher levered firms have monotone incentive to encourage 
CEOs adopting higher personal leverage to decrease the agency cost of debt.  
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FIGURE 6: Average Inside Debt and Its Components, by Firm Leverage 
Figure 6: Average Inside Debt and Its Components, by Firm Leverage. Figure 6 shows the 
relation between the CEO personal leverage and the firm leverage-an inverted U-shape relation: 
CEO’s personal leverage increases when the firm leverage (accounting value) becomes higher, 
after the firm leverage reaches a point, the CEO’s personal leverages decrease with the increasing 
level of the firm leverage. The association between the firms’ match rates and the firm leverages 
follows a similar inverted U-shape pattern. 
 
TABLE 5: Mean Values of CEO and Firm Variables, by Firm Leverage 
 No debt LEV1 LEV2 LEV3 LEV4 
Total assets(bn.) 1.418 16.871 39.915 12.648 12.449 
Leverage 0 0.039 0.148 0.248 0.443 
Firm age 16.9 22.2 30.1 29.6 25.5 
Pension value(mm.) 0.298 2.581 3.925 3.514 2.586 
Deferred compensation(mm.) 0.367 2.666 2.958 2.629 2.483 
Inside debt value(mm.) 0.606 5.355 6.928 6.256 5.110 
Inside debt /(inside debt+equity value) 0.064 0.145 0.204 0.228 0.202 
Leverage indicator 0.293 0.448 0.420 0.346 0.209 
Annual firm contribution to DCP(mm.) 0.012 0.155 0.073 0.077 0.270 
Annual CEO contribution to 
DCP(mm.) 
0.041 0.324 0.316 0.249 0.181 
Annual pension increment(mm.) 0.036 0.423 0.555 0.549 0.450 
Annual DCP increment(mm.) 0.053 0.480 0.390 0.327 0.451 
Match rate of DCP 0.073 0.144 0.218 0.195 0.169 
CEO ownership percentage 0.032 0.026 0.018 0.016 0.099 
CEO contribution/ (Salary+Bonus) 0.043 0.160 0.123 0.116 0.075 
Note: 
Descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO and firm characteristics for a sample of 1,947 
observations from S&P 1500 companies over 2006 to 2008. Data is from COMPUSTAT 
Execucomp. 
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In addition, I find that CEO personal leverage is positively associated with firm 
age, consistent to Sundaram and Yermack(2006)’s results. Table 6 shows that CEOs in 
older firms have higher inside debts and personal leverages. And the older the firms 
are, the more likely the CEOs personal leverage will be higher than the firm leverage. 
 
TABLE 6: Mean Values of CEO and Firm Variables, by Firm Age 
 5- 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 40+ 
Total assets(bn.) 5.533 10.864 8.642 20.863 37.381 23.515 
Total net sales(bn.) 2.893 3.195 3.474 6.369 7.982 16.681 
Pension value(mm.) 0.918 1.196 1.120 2.114 3.835 7.395 
Deferred compensation(mm.) 1.060 1.799 1.256 2.306 3.269 4.699 
Inside debt value(mm.) 1.971 3.023 2.395 4.532 7.181 12.182 
Equity value(mm.) 94.946 67.378 93.731 247.92 880.99 63.182 
Inside debt /(inside debt+equity value) 0.089 0.109 0.114 0.152 0.262 0.325 
Inside debt / equity value 0.181 0.272 0.270 0.369 0.694 0.865 
Leverage indicator 0.221 0.237 0.258 0.329 0.508 0.573 
Annual firm contribution to DCP(mm.) 0.082 0.107 0.046 0.172 0.082 0.354 
Annual CEO contribution to 
DCP(mm.) 
0.218 0.143 0.120 0.243 0.290 0.473 
Match rate of DCP 0.140 0.126 0.141 0.125 0.212 0.228 
CEO ownership percentage 0.041 0.141 0.022 0.023 0.019 0.013 
CEO contribution/(Salary+Bonus) 0.179 0.081 0.063 0.105 0.144 0.128 
Note: 
Descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO and firm characteristics for a sample of 1,947 
observations from S&P 1500 companies over 2006 to 2008. Data is from COMPUSTAT 
Execucomp. 
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Figure 7 show that CEOs’ leverages increase with the firm size. Larger firms 
have higher CEO leverages and large percentage of CEOs whose personal leverages 
are higher than firm leverage ratio. It is consistent with Sundaram and Yermack 
(2006). 
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FIGURE 7: Average Firm Leverage and CEO Inside Debt, by Firm Size 
Figure 7: Average Firm Leverage and CEO Inside Debt, by Firm Size. CEO leverage increases 
with the firm size. While middle-cap firms and large-cap firms have similar firm leverages, larger 
firms have higher CEO leverages and large percentage of CEOs whose personal leverages are 
higher than firm leverage ratio. 
4.2 VARIABLES 
4.2.1 Pension Valuation and Deferred Compensation Balance 
Since year 2006, firms are required to report the present value of their pension value 
and deferred compensation balances. Same as Wei and Yermack(2010), I directly use 
the pension value and deferred compensation balance in COMPUTATE to calculate 
the inside debt. I compared the results of firm reported pension value with the 
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estimated pension value in Sundaram and Yermack (2006). The basic statistics of two 
valuations are quite close and I believe the reported present value of pension and 
deferred compensation are comparable with the estimated value in Sundaram and 
Yermack (2006). 
4.2.2 Dependent Variables 
This paper studies the determinants of inside debt and its components. I obtain the 
main components of inside debt from COMPUSTAT Executive Compensation data 
base. PENSION_VALUE_TOT is the present value of CEO pension and 
DEFER_BALANCE_TOT is the present value of deferred compensation. The total 
inside debt is the sum of total pension value and deferred compensation balance. Then 
I use the estimated inside debt to calculate the CEO debt-to-equity ratio or CEO 
personal leverage, CEO_LEV. CEO_LEV is calculated by total inside debt over total 
CEO equity holdings plus total inside debt. The CEO equity holdings are the sum of 
the market value of CEO’s stock and option holdings. Another dependent variable, 
MATCH_RATE is used to measure the firm’s willingness to encourage the CEO’s 
contributions to deferred compensation. MATCH_RATE is the ratio of annual firm 
match contribution to deferred compensation account (DEFER_CONTRIB_CO_TOT) 
and annual executive contribution to deferred compensation account 
(DEFER_CONTRIB_EXEC_TOT).  
In studying the determinants of deferred compensation, I use another two 
dependent variables: the CEO contribution to deferred compensation account 
(DEFER_CONTRIB_EXEC_TOT) and the CEO contribution ratio. CEO 
contribution ratio is the ratio of the CEO contribution 
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(DEFER_CONTRIB_EXEC_TOT) over the annual cash compensation (Salary + 
Bonus + Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation). I choose cash compensation 
instead of total compensation because for the majority of the firms CEOs are usually 
allowed to defer their cash compensation only. 
4.2.3 Explanatory Variables 
A. Firm Characteristics 
Firm leverage: the firm leverage ratio LEVERAGE is measured as the ratio of long 
term debt to the book value of total assets. And I also build a dummy variable as one if 
CEO personal leverage ratio is higher than firm leverage ratio, zero otherwise. Firm 
Size: I use the natural logarithm of total assets LOGAT to control for size effect. 
Liquidity: I measure the firms’ cash flow condition, LIQUIDITY, as an indicator 
variable that equals one if the firm has negative operating cash flow. Growth: To 
measure investment opportunities, I use the ratio of the research and development 
expenditures to total sales, GROWTH, as a proxy for growth opportunities. Tax status: 
I include an indicator variable TAX for whether the firm has net operating loss carry 
forwards on its balance sheet as a proxy for its tax status. Firm age: I include the firm 
age YEARS to control potential firm age effect on growth, corporate governance 
quality, and CEO compensation. 
B. CEO Characteristics 
CEOs with more control power over their boards or more negotiation power in 
contracting employment agreement may influence their compensation and benefit 
packages. I use following variables to measure the CEO’s control power or negotiation 
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power: Tenure: TENURE is the natural logarithm of CEO tenure. On one hand, senior 
CEOs with longer tenures are more likely powerful over the board; On the other hand, 
pension benefits and deferred compensation typically increase monotonically in 
CEOs’ years with firms. CEO hired from outside: I also include a dummy variable 
OUTSIDER to indicator whether CEOs are hired from outside the firm. As discussed 
in Sundaram and Yermack (2006) this variable may control for the negotiation on 
special pension or deferred compensation provisions in employment contracts of new 
CEOs from outside. Founder CEO: FOUNDER is an indicator variable coded as one 
if the CEO is one of the founders, and zero otherwise. CEOs who are founders are 
assumed to be relatively more powerful. CEO duality: I also include CEO-chairman 
duality dummy CEODUAL. 
C. Performance of DCP Investment and Firm Performance 
Return of DCP: I estimate the return of DCP, RET_DCP, by dividing the earnings of 
DCP (DEFER_EARNINGS_TOT) by deferred compensation balance 
(DEFER_BALANCE_TOT) in the beginning of the fiscal year. For those firms 
missing the last deferred compensation balance observations, I estimate them by 
subtracting the CEO contribution to DCP (DEFER_CONTRIB_EXEC_TOT), firm 
contribution to DCP (DEFER_CONTRIB_CO_TOT) and current year earnings in 
DCP (DEFER_EARNINGS_TOT) from the deferred compensation balance 
(DEFER_BALANCE_TOT) at year end. 
Firm Performance: Firm performance can affect the level of inside debt because both 
pension and deferred compensation are partially functions of salary and bonus. To 
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control for performance, I use two variables: ROA is the ratio of net operating income 
to the book value of assets; RET is the annual return on common equity (monthly 
compounded).  
D. Other Control Variables 
I include the control variables used in Sundaram and Yermack (2006) such as board 
characteristics and institutional investors. They are used to proxy the corporate 
governance quality: BOARD SIZE is the natural logarithm of the number of directors. 
CEOs of firms with larger boards are assumed to have more power because of 
increased coordination costs (Yermack 1996). OUTSIDE DIRECTORS is the 
percentage of outsiders on the board, with a higher percentage of outsiders expected to 
decrease CEO power because CEOs have more influence over the careers of insiders 
(Byrd and Hickman 1992). To measure the level and quality of institutional investor 
influence, I use AVGTOP5HLD, the percentage of top five institutional investors’ 
equity holdings. The institutions may serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency 
problem between shareholders and managers. Evidences show that institutional 
ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation (Hartzell 
and Starks, 2003). Institutional ownership is taken from the CDA/Spectrum database 
of 13Fs. Distance to Default (DtD), the number of standard deviations between the 
mean of the distribution of a firm’s asset value and the default point (DPT) (where 
DPT = (short-term debt) + 1/2 (long-term debt)). DtD is a widely accepted indicator of 
default likelihood. 
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5 REGRESSION ANALYSES 
5.1 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
In this section I develop hypotheses to study the determinants of inside debt and its 
components. Specifically, I develop hypotheses about the determinants of deferred 
compensation and CEO’s contribution to deferred compensation. 
5.1.1 The Determinants of Inside Debt 
The importance of inside debt in compensation of individual managers was not well 
addressed until the theoretical work of Edmans and Liu (2007). In a standard 
executive compensation and agency problem, equity-like compensation improves the 
managerial incentives to exert effort and aligns managers’ interests with equity 
holders’ benefit. But it may exacerbate a risk-shifting problem which conflicts with 
debt holders’ benefit. Firms can align manager interests with those of debt holders by 
including debt-like compensation in managerial contracts. Therefore, my first 
hypothesis is from the optimal contracting argument, which argues that firms use 
inside debt to alleviate agency cost of debt. 
H0: Deferred compensation and pension are both inside debt to firms. I expect that 
deferred compensation, as an instrument to alleviate the agency cost of debt, has the 
same determinants as pension. 
H0a: Because debt-based compensation reduces the agency costs of debt, I should 
observe a positive association between the CEO’s inside debt and the firm’s leverage. 
H0b: Equity compensation pays executives without the use of cash. However 
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pension or DCP need cash payout in the future. Therefore firms with lower future cash 
flow are less likely to compensate with inside debt. I expect a negative association 
between cash flow liquidity and CEOs inside debt. 
H0c: Equity pay is expected to be used when a firm has many valuable investment 
opportunities that are best understood by managers instead of outside shareholders or 
directors. Moreover, firms with growth opportunities are less likely to face agency 
costs of debt because they have opportunities to invest in projects that maximize both 
shareholder and debt holder value. Accordingly, I expect a negative association 
between measures of growth opportunities and the CEO’s inside debt. 
H0d: Firms use inside debt as a tax saving instrument. When there is no tax saving 
needed, the firm will pay by inside debt, which will result in a tax savings for the 
future. I expect a positive association between inside debt and tax status, which is 
measured by an indicator of net operating loss-forwards. 
H0e: A CEO with more power over the board may use inside debt as a method of 
extracting additional rents. I expect that inside debt has a positive association with 
CEO power and a negative association with board efficiency. 
5.1.2 The Determinants of the Contribution to DCP 
Even though deferred compensation and pensions share some features of inside debt, 
deferred compensation decisions are mainly made by CEOs annually whereas most 
pension contracts are set when CEOs are first employed. This makes deferred 
determinants different from pensions. I develop the alternative hypotheses to exploit 
the factors may affect the deferred compensation differently from pensions.  
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H1: Unlike a pension, which is set when CEO is hired, deferred compensation is in 
large degree determined by CEOs and varies every year. Therefore, I expect that 
deferred compensation has different determinants than those of pensions. 
H1a: High equity holding makes the CEO an owner-manager so that the CEO 
mainly retains equity interest in the firm. Therefore CEOs with high equity holdings 
are less interested in inside debt holdings. I expect a negative association between 
CEO equity value and their contributions to DCPs. 
H1b: DCP is an income taxation instrument for CEOs. CEOs with higher personal 
equity value tend to have higher income tax rate. So I expect that CEOs with higher 
equity values have higher contributions to DCPs. I further expect that CEOs will 
dynamically increase their contributions to DCPs if they have high equity value 
increases. 
H1c: CEOs assess firm default risk when they decide to contribute to DCPs. CEOs 
accept high DCPs when firms are far away from default. So I expect positive 
association between contribution to DCPs and firm risk. 
H1d: ROA is the main accounting measure of performance in determining 
executive bonus. High ROA typically results in high annual bonuses. Higher previous 
bonuses result in CEOs’ higher personal income tax and lower need for cash. 
Therefore, I expect that lagged ROA has a positive association with contributions to 
DCP.  
H1e: Stock return can affect both CEOs’ equity value and their annual bonuses. 
An increasing in equity value or annual bonus may increase CEOs’ income tax rate 
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and decrease their cash need. Therefore, I expect that CEOs will increase their DCP 
contribution if the lagged firm stock return is higher. 
H1e: DCP is also an investment instrument, so I expect that CEOs with a higher 
expected DCP return will contribute more to their DCPs. 
5.2 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
I first examine the determinants of inside debt levels and their components. I apply 
Sundaram and Yermack’s regression model as the base model to investigate the 
impact of firm leverage on CEO inside debt holdings. I estimate Tobit models to 
account for CEOs who do not receive pension benefits or deferred compensation 
packages.  
First, I estimate the following specification to explain cross-sectional variation in 
inside debt levels and their components: 
Yit = Ln(ASSETS)it + Ln(CEO TENURE)it +LEVERAGEit + LIQUIDITYit + 
GROWTHit+ TAXit + YEARSit + OUTSIDEit + Xit  
Here Yit represents inside debt and its components: pension value, deferred 
compensation balance, total inside debt, CEO leverage ratio and firm match rate. Xit 
represents all other control variables including board size, board independence, and 
other CEO characteristics. To avoid the clustering effect, I take the mean of each 
variable for each case across time and run regression on the collapsed dataset of means. 
Next, I estimate the determinants of the CEO contribution to deferred 
compensation cross-sectional variation: 
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(CEO Contribution)it = Ln(ASSETS)it + Ln(CEO TENURE)it +LEVERAGEit + 
LIQUIDITYit + GROWTHit+ TAXit + YEARSit + OUTSIDEit + (Distance to Default)it + 
(CEO Equity Holdings)it + Xit  
In this model, CEO contribution represents both contribution level and 
contribution rate. To avoid the clustering effect, I also use the collapsed dataset of 
means. 
I also estimate the dynamic determinants of CEO contribution rate change. I add 
CEO equity value change to proxy the wealth change and the firm performance 
measures (ROA and RET) to proxy annual compensation change. 
∆(CEO Contribution)it = Ln(∆ASSETS)it + ∆LEVERAGEit + ∆LIQUIDITYit + 
∆GROWTHit+ ∆TAXit +∆(CEO EQUITY)it+∆ RETit + ∆ROAit + ∆Xit  
Since the change of contribution level is very sensitive to the change of salary 
and bonus, here only the change of contribution ratio is studied. The contribution rate 
is relatively stable and is merely CEO’s personal decision that can convey CEO’s 
attitude on deferred compensation. To avoid the noise, I normalize all the independent 
variables into indicator variables: one if the change is positive and zero if otherwise. 
5.3 REGRESSION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.3.1 Cross-sectional Determinants of Inside Debt and Its Components 
The regression results on pension, deferred compensation, total inside debt, CEO 
leverage and firm match rate can be seen at Table 7. 
A positive association exists between the CEO leverage and the firm leverage. 
However, pension, deferred compensation and total inside debt do not show any 
significant associations with the firm leverage. Since the univariate analysis in section 
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IV suggests an inverted U-shape relation between firm leverage and inside debt, I then 
include the quadratic term of firm leverage in the model. When the quadratic term of 
firm leverage is included, pension, inside debt total, CEO leverage and firm match rate 
all show an inverted U-shape relation with firm leverage. Deferred compensation still 
shows no relation with firm leverage. (See at Table 8). 
 To check whether the non-linear relation is driven by sample composition, I 
apply the model on SP 500 companies only and use pension only as the proxy of 
inside debt as Sundaram and Yermack did. The results are shown at Table 9. The non-
linear relation consistently exists. 
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TABLE 7: Tobit Regression without Quadratic Term of Firm Leverage 
Dependent variable: Pension DCP Pension+DCP (Pension+DCP)/ 
CEO equity value 
Firm match 
rate 
Intercept -38.655*** -15.459*** -32.022*** -1.015*** -4.810*** 
 (-10.02) (-9.81) (-10.98) (-8.22) (-7.36) 
CEO tenure with the firm 1.461*** 0.713*** 1.660*** 0.010 0.103** 
 (4.10) (5.69) (6.63) (0.17) (2.02) 
CEO hired from outside indicator -2.917*** -0.060 -1.825*** -0.041 -0.294* 
 (-3.94) (-0.94) (-3.65) (-1.49) (-1.64) 
Firm size 1.637*** 0.781*** 1.797*** 0.022*** 0.151*** 
 (8.45) (9.89) (12.02) (4.56) (4.39) 
Leverage 0.063 0.347 0.615 0.129*** 0.001 
 (0.09) (0.37) (0.02) (3.17) (0.27) 
Liquidity -3.561*** -0.678*** -1.644*** -0.025 -0.370*** 
 (-2.83) (-1.67) (-1.95) (-0.02) (-2.24) 
Growth -14.911*** -2.623* -6.553*** -0.389*** -1.774*** 
 (-3.71) (-1.82) (-2.63) (-4.18) (-2.71) 
Tax status indicator 0.103 0.268 0.141 0.027 0.155* 
 (0.50) (0.18) (0.15) (1.42) (1.74) 
Years since founding of firms 0.134*** 0.020*** 0.111*** 0.004*** -0.003 
 (9.49) (3.19) (8.02) (8.34) (-0.87) 
Pctg of top five institutional holdings -0.005 0.004 0.011 0.004*** 0.006 
 (-0.31) (0.62) (0.60) (4.27) (1.09) 
Founder CEO indicator -2.936*** -1.845** -1.882*** -0.070*** -0.601*** 
 (-2.77) (-2.58) (-3.39) (-2.21) (-3.37) 
Board size 4.582*** 2.690*** 4.626*** 0.220*** 0.955*** 
 (3.21) (3.46) (3.42) (3.87) (4.08) 
Pctg of outside directors 14.194*** 2.362** 7.910*** 0.313*** 1.018** 
 (4.58) (2.24) (3.50) (3.14) (1.88) 
Leverage^2      
      
CEO–Chair duality      
      
Obs# 1388 1388 1388 1388 1388 
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TABLE 7: Tobit Regression without Quadratic Term of Firm Leverage (Continued) 
Note: 
Tobit regression estimates of inside debts and its components. To avoid the clustering effect, I take the mean of each variable for each case across time 
and running regression on the collapsed dataset of means. Pension is the aggregate actuarial present value of the executive's accumulated pension 
benefit. DCP is the aggregate balance in non-tax-qualified deferred compensation plans. CEO equity value equals the value of common stock plus 
stock options, calculated according to the estimated market value at fiscal year end. Firm match rate is the ratio of firm match contribution and 
executive contribution to deferred compensation account. Leverage equals total long-term dent divided by total debt plus the book value (or market 
value) of equity. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has negative operating 
cash flow. Growth is the ratio of the research and development expenditures to total sales. Tax status is an indicator variable equals one if the firm has 
net operating loss carry forwards on its balance sheet. T-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 8: Tobit Regression with Quadratic Term of Firm Leverage 
Dependent variable: Pension DCP Pension+DCP (Pension+DCP)/ 
CEO equity value 
Firm match rate 
Intercept -34.075*** -15.327*** -29.467*** -0.891*** -4.546*** 
 (-9.45) (-9.59) (-10.58) (-7.80) (-6.98) 
CEO tenure with the firm 1.154*** 0.698*** 1.488*** 0.008 0.081 
 (2.95) (5.36) (5.85) (0.24) (1.50) 
CEO hired from outside indicator -2.808*** -0.068 -1.778*** -0.040 -0.276 
 (-3.82) (-0.91) (-3.56) (-1.42) (-1.52) 
Firm size 1.333*** 0.769*** 1.639*** 0.015*** 0.130*** 
 (7.36) (9.52) (11.28) (3.93) (3.81) 
Leverage 9.908*** 0.286 5.902* 0.361*** 1.486** 
 (2.82) (0.95) (1.69) (3.47) (2.31) 
Liquidity -3.249*** -0.680*** -1.571** -0.023 -0.366** 
 (-2.67) (-1.66) (-1.91) (-0.08) (-2.18) 
Growth -13.815*** -2.491 -6.126** -0.373*** -1.545** 
 (-3.31) (-1.68) (-2.30) (-3.86) (-2.35) 
Tax status indicator 0.093 0.268 0.175 0.026 0.154* 
 (0.55) (0.16) (0.09) (1.42) (1.75) 
Years since founding of firms 0.120*** 0.020*** 0.102*** 0.004** -0.003 
 (8.65) (2.96) (7.39) (7.87) (-1.31) 
Pctg of top five institutional holdings -0.003 0.004 0.008 0.003*** 0.005 
 (-0.40) (0.61) (0.63) (4.22) (1.01) 
Founder CEO indicator -3.074*** -0.503*** -2.009*** -0.068* -0.604*** 
 (-2.93) (-2.60) (-3.59) (-2.25) (-3.41) 
Board size 4.882*** 2.671*** 4.921*** 0.230*** 0.920*** 
 (3.03) (3.37) (3.32) (3.69) (3.90) 
Pctg of outside directors 9.946*** 2.273** 5.380*** 0.209*** 0.821* 
 (4.00) (2.10) (3.15) (2.84) (1.83) 
Leverage^2 -17.267*** -0.947 -12.466* -0.328** -2.502** 
 (-2.99) (-0.88) (-1.65) (-2.47) (-2.35) 
CEO–Chair duality 2.387*** 0.091 1.509*** 0.020** 0.124* 
 (4.04) (0.78) (2.89) (1.91) (1.67) 
Obs# 1388 1388 1388 1388 1388 
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TABLE 8: Tobit Regression with Quadratic Term of Firm Leverage (Continued) 
Note: 
Tobit regression estimates of inside debts and its components. To avoid the clustering effect, I take the mean of each variable for each case across time 
and running regression on the collapsed dataset of means. Pension is the aggregate actuarial present value of the executive's accumulated pension 
benefit. DCP is the aggregate balance in non-tax-qualified deferred compensation plans. CEO equity value equals the value of common stock plus 
stock options, calculated according to the estimated market value at fiscal year end. Firm match rate is the ratio of firm match contribution and 
executive contribution to deferred compensation account. Leverage equals total long-term dent divided by total debt plus the book value (or market 
value) of equity. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has negative operating 
cash flow. Growth is the ratio of the research and development expenditures to total sales. Tax status is an indicator variable equals one if the firm has 
net operating loss carry forwards on its balance sheet. T-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 9: Mimicking Sundaram and Yermack’s Regression on S&P 500 
Dependent variable: Pension Pension 
CEO tenure with the firm 1.790** 1.687** 
 (2.44) (2.29) 
CEO hired from outside indicator -6.739*** -6.535*** 
 (-2.68) (-2.59) 
Firm size 2.508*** 2.428*** 
 (4.30) (4.15) 
Leverage 4.011 33.154*** 
 (0.92) (2.58) 
Liquidity -7.528* -8.029* 
 (-1.60) (-1.73) 
Growth -21.916** -17.882* 
 (-2.41) (-1.94) 
Tax status indicator 1.008 1.099 
 (0.85) (0.92) 
Years since founding of firms 0.163*** 0.155*** 
 (5.61) (5.36) 
Leverage^2  -56.744** 
  (-2.41) 
Obs# 342 342 
Note:  
Tobit regression estimates of pension. This regression is used to check the comparability with 
Sundaram and Yermack(2006)’s sample with large firms. To avoid the clustering effect, I take the 
mean of each variable for each case across time and running regression on the collapsed dataset of 
means. Pension is the aggregate actuarial present value of the executive's accumulated pension 
benefit. Leverage equals total long-term dent divided by total debt plus the book value (or market 
value) of equity. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the firm has negative operating cash flow. Growth is the ratio of the research and 
development expenditures to total sales. Tax status is an indicator variable equals one if the firm 
has net operating loss carry forwards on its balance sheet. 
Coefficients of other explanatory variables (Percentage of top five institutional holdings, Founder 
CEO indicator, Board size, Percentage of outside directors, CEO duality) skipped for space saving. 
t-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% 
(*) levels. 
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The other explanatory variables show consistent results with Sundaram and 
Yermack: larger firms pay more inside debt, senior CEOs tend to have more inside 
debt and its components, and older firms pay larger inside debt than younger firms. I 
also find evidence that firms with less liquidity in cash flow (negative operating 
income) and more growth opportunities tend to pay less inside debt. I do not obtain a 
significant estimate for the variable measuring tax status except that firms with tax 
loss forwards tend to match more and encourage deferred compensation. 
Unlike Sundaram and Yermack, I find that CEOs hired from outside tend to have 
less pension but more deferred compensation.  
5.3.2 Determinants of CEO Contribution to DCP 
This paper is the first empirical work to study the determinants of CEO deferred 
compensation. Even though deferred compensation and pension share some features of 
inside debt, regression analysis in the previous section shows that deferred 
compensation has quite different determinants from pension. I next demonstrate the 
differences and exploit the factors that may affect the deferred compensation. The 
deferred compensations have three basic components: CEO contribution, firm match 
contribution, and earnings from DCP investment. At the end of each fiscal year, CEOs 
decide how much percentage (contribution ratio) or amount (contribution level) they 
wish to contribute to their DCPs from their salary and bonus compensation during the 
next year. Firms simply match the CEO contribution with a contractual match rate 
(usually from zero to one). 
Both regressions on level and ratio show consistent results. 
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TABLE 10: Tobit Regression on CEO Contribution to DCP 
Dependent variable: CEO 
contribution 
CEO 
contribution 
rate 
CEO 
contribution 
CEO 
contribution 
rate 
CEO tenure with the firm 0.065 0.007 0.106*** 0.015* 
 (1.58) (0.82) (2.54) (1.75) 
CEO hired from outside  0.014 0.022 0.027 0.023 
 (0.10) (0.78) (0.20) (0.82) 
Firm size 0.207*** 0.029*** 0.191*** 0.027*** 
 (7.49) (4.99) (6.56) (4.37) 
Leverage -0.068 -0.027 -0.227 -0.055 
 (-0.35) (-0.67) (-1.16) (-1.33) 
Liquidity -0.393*** -0.079*** -0.235* -0.053** 
 (-2.97) (-2.89) (-1.77) (-1.93) 
Growth -0.380 -0.139 -0.287 -0.117 
 (-0.98) (-1.64) (-0.77) (-1.40) 
Tax status indicator 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.006 
 (0.07) (0.42) (0.03) (0.44) 
Distance to default   0.142*** 0.024*** 
   (4.69) (3.72) 
CEO equity value   -0.762*** -0.169*** 
   (-2.92) (-2.94) 
OBS# 1388 1388 1388 1388 
Note: 
Tobit regression estimates of CEO contribution to DCP. To avoid the clustering effect, I take the 
mean of each variable for each case across time and running regression on the collapsed dataset of 
means. CEO contribution is the annual executive contribution to deferred compensation account. 
CEO contribution rate is the ratio of the annual executive contribution to DCP and annual cash 
compensation. Leverage equals total long-term dent divided by total debt plus the book value (or 
market value) of equity. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the firm has negative operating cash flow. Growth is the ratio of the 
research and development expenditures to total sales. Tax status is an indicator variable equals one 
if the firm has net operating loss carry forwards on its balance sheet.  
Coefficients of other explanatory variables (Percentage of top five institutional holdings, Founder 
CEO indicator, Board size, Percentage of outside directors, Firm age) skipped for space saving. T-
statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
levels. 
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No significant association is found between firm leverage and CEO contribution 
to DCP. CEOs in larger firms tend to contribute more. CEOs in firms with less cash 
(that is, with negative operating income) tend to contribute less. I also find that CEOs 
in firms with less likelihood of default tend to contribute more. This suggests that 
CEOs assess firm risk when making deferred compensation decisions. The result with 
regard to CEO wealth supports the owner-manager hypothesis, not support the income 
tax hypothesis. The potential reason for this result is that for the majority of CEOs 
with equity holdings, the income tax rates have already hit the maximum level so that 
there is no further income tax benefit that can be extracted from deferred 
compensation.  
The dynamic regressions on contribution rate change find the evidence of that 
CEO equity value change has a positive effect on CEO contribution change. 
Both ROA and stock returns have positive impacts on CEO contribution change. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that argues that the increase of wealth 
in current period will result in the increase in deferred compensation in next period for 
less cash need and lower the income tax rate. 
In addition, I find a positive association between the firm leverage change and 
CEO contribution rate change. Since cross-sectional analysis does not find an 
association between firm leverage and CEO contribution rate, the dynamic association 
suggests a behavioral explanation: when CEOs intend to increase firm debt, they may 
increase the inside debt holdings to signal the debt holders in order to decrease the 
debt cost. 
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TABLE 11: Regression on Dynamic Change of CEO Contribution 
Dependent variable Change of contribution rate 
Firm size 0.039*** 
 (3.36) 
Leverage 0.054*** 
 (4.65) 
Liquidity -0.028 
 (-1.06) 
Growth -0.003 
 (-0.19) 
Tax 0.049* 
 (1.86) 
Institutional holdings 0.069*** 
 (6.16) 
CEO equity value 0.096*** 
 (5.85) 
ROA 0.046*** 
 (3.87) 
Stock return 0.034*** 
 (2.79) 
Return on DCP 0.086*** 
 (5.03) 
Obs# 4284 
R2 0.08 
Note: 
OLS regression estimates of CEO contribution rate to DCP. To study the dynamic decision of 
contribution rate, I take the dynamic change of each variable and normalize them into dummy 
variables: one if increase and zero otherwise. I run regression on the dataset of these dummies. 
CEO contribution rate is the ratio of the annual executive contribution to DCP and annual cash 
compensation. Leverage equals total long-term dent divided by total debt plus the book value (or 
market value) of equity. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the firm has negative operating cash flow. Growth is the ratio of the 
research and development expenditures to total sales. Tax status is an indicator variable equals one 
if the firm has net operating loss carry forwards on its balance sheet. CEO equity value equals the 
market value of common stock plus stock options at fiscal year end. ROA is the ratio of net 
operating income to the book value of assets. Stock return is the annual return on common equity 
(monthly compounded). Return on DCP is estimated by dividing the earnings on DCP by deferred 
compensation balance in the beginning of that fiscal year. t-statistics appear in parentheses below 
each estimate. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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5.3.3 Comparison of the Difference between DCP and Pension 
One can see that deferred compensation and pension share some features of inside 
debt. But they also have substantial differences in terms of their contributors and 
decision makers. 
The primary difference is that firm leverage has no economic impact on CEO 
deferred compensation level and its contribution decision. Cross sectional analysis 
shows that the absolute values of regression coefficients in the pension model are all 
larger than that in deferred compensation model. This suggests that deferred 
compensation is less sensitive than pension to firm characteristics and CEO 
characteristics. 
I do not find evidence that firms pay CEOs hired outside more deferred 
compensation; instead I find that CEOs hired outside have lower pensions. This result 
is consistent with the impact of tenure because usually CEOs hired inside have longer 
tenure than new employed CEOs from outside. 
The different impact from CEO duality shows that if managerial rent extraction 
problems exist for powerful CEOs, those CEOs’ appetites are for pensions, not for 
deferred compensation.  
Overall, these differences suggest that in terms of aligning the principal-agent 
interests, pension is a better instrument to play the role of inside debt than deferred 
compensation. 
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5.4 WHY INVERTED U-SHAPE 
The regression results show a quadratic inverted U-shape relation between CEO 
personal leverage and firm leverage. This suggests that the associated agency problem 
in CEO inside debt compensation may be more complex than conventionally thought.  
5.4.1 Potential Explanations of the Inverted U-shape 
My result is not the only evidence of inverted U-shape relation in firm leverage and 
executive compensation literature. Gianluca and Speciale (2010) also find a similar 
relation between the firm leverage and the executive pay-to-performance sensitivity. 
The inverted U-shape relation between the firm leverage and the inside debt 
components consistently exists for pension, CEO debt-to-equity ratio and firm match 
rate. The potential reasons are unknown. I here attempt to exploit the explanation by 
suggesting two hypotheses: firm optimal selection and manager risk aversion selection. 
Firm optimal selection suggests that the inverted U-shape is the firm’s optimal 
policy based on its agency cost of debt concern. Therefore, firms with higher-than-
average leverages may have other mechanisms other than inside debt compensation to 
reduce the agency cost of debt (Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2005)). Or for these 
highly leveraged firms, creditors may require conservative financial reporting and 
stronger covenants to help creditors effectively monitor their investment. So the 
agency cost of debt may be reduced (Guay (2008)). Empirical works also suggest that 
firms with higher leverages may have fewer opportunities for risk-shifting and asset 
substitution—for example, firms in mature industries without growth opportunities 
(Talberg et al (2008)). It is also possible that, when firms have higher leverages, debt 
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holders may hold equity of that firm (called dual holder) or sit on the board so that 
CEOs in some degree may act in the interest of debt holder (Jiang, Li and Shao 
(2010)). 
In other words, firm optimal selection argues that high leverage itself may be a 
result of lower agency cost of debt.  
The manager risk aversion selection argument suggests that the inverted U-shape 
could also be driven by CEOs risk aversion decision. If the firm leverage exceeds the 
CEO’s “optimal” level or a CEO foresees high risk of bankruptcy and financial 
distress, the CEO will be reluctant to leave his or her own wealth in the firm’s inside 
debt. In this case, CEOs will be less interested in being compensated in inside debt and 
even will be withdrawing the inside debt to reduce their personal wealth loss risk. 
5.4.2 Analysis on the Inverted U-shape 
In order to test the above two arguments, I use univariate analysis to investigate the 
potential reasons. First, I explore the firm leverage level at which firms start to drop 
CEO leverage. Based on my regression analysis results in Table 8, I yield the 
following equation to express the relation between CEO leverage and firm leverage: 
(CEO Leverage)it = 0.36(LEVERAGE)it -0.33(LEVERAGE^2)it +CXit  
Xit is a vector representing all other control variables and C is a vector of 
coefficients of these control variables. Using basic calculation, I yield that CEO 
leverage reaches the highest level when firm leverage ratio is around 0.54. Basic 
statistics show that, among 1480 sample firms in regression analysis, there are 55 
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firms with leverage higher than 0.54. These 55 firms account for 4% of the total 
sample firms. In another words, the negative association between CEO leverage 
and firm leverage only happens on 4% firms. This suggests that taken as a whole, 
inside debt basically is still positively associated with firm leverage. But unlike a 
linear pattern found by Sundaram and Yermack, this paper finds a non-linear 
pattern. 
 
FIGURE 8: Non-Linear Relation between CEO Leverage and Firm Leverage 
Figure 8: Non-Linear Relation between CEO Leverage and Firm Leverage. CEO leverage 
reaches the highest level when firm leverage ratio is around 0.54. 0.74 is the maximum of the firm 
leverage ratio in my sample universe. Basic statistics show that among 1480 sample firms in 
regression analysis, there are 55 firms with leverage higher than 0.54. These 55 firms account for 
4% of the total sample firms in regression analysis. 
I further on check why these 55 firms have low CEO leverage and negative 
association between CEO leverage and firm leverage.  By the firm optimal selection 
argument, the positive relation between firm leverage and CEO leverage should be 
more important in firms that are more likely to suffer from the asset substitution 
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problem. Therefore, for these 55 firms, I expect that they have less asset substitution 
problem. By the CEO risk aversion argument, CEOs reduce inside debt holdings when 
a firm is under high bankruptcy risk. Therefore I expect these 55 firms have higher 
financial distress than that of the other groups. 
I compare the mean (median) firm fundamentals of these 55 firms with the 
sample mean (median) and that of the other five groups built on firm leverage 
quintiles. 
In Table 12, group 6 represents these 55 firms that have negative association 
between CEO leverage and firm leverage. The univariate analysis does not find the 
evidence of the hypothesis arguing that low CEO leverage firms may have low agency 
cost of debt or less demand of new capital. No evidence shows that group 6 has 
significant low investment. The mean and median of capital expenditure of group 6 is 
about the same as the sample mean and median. Group 6 even has the highest mean 
value of R&D expense to total sales. When I use R&D expenditure plus capital 
expenditure over total assets to proxy the investment, the results show that the mean 
and median investment of these 55 firms is about the same or even a little bit higher 
than the average. This means these 55 firms are still active in investment. 
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TABLE 12: Univariate Analysis of Inverted U-Shape 
Panel A: Mean Comparison, by Firm Leverage 
 All Group1  Group2 Group3 Group4 Group5 Group6 
Firm Leverage 0.180 0.000 0.040 0.149 0.248 0.390 0.746 
CEO Leverage 0.179 0.069 0.157 0.212 0.232 0.214 0.203 
INVESTMENT 0.100 0.130 0.101 0.083 0.083 0.081 0.145 
GROWTH 0.126 0.185 0.144 0.053 0.055 0.067 0.684 
Tobins Q 1.814 2.475 1.856 1.617 1.602 1.511 2.099 
Z-SCORE 235.36 2115.78 601.269 6.293 4.056 2.547 -0.724 
Bond Rating A AAA AA A A BBB BB+ 
DtD 2.811 2.338 2.831 2.983 3.006 2.691 2.080 
Pi 4.633 4.663 2.804 3.221 3.184 7.343 18.867 
EPS 4.846 0.915 8.492 11.973 1.458 0.395 -0.912 
ROA 0.040 0.050 0.047 0.051 0.042 0.011 0.040 
ROE 0.005 0.069 0.015 0.106 0.152 -0.277 -0.153 
DCP withdraw 28.46 16.62 26.98 29.28 31.80 38.05 22.77 
Cash-out rate % 2.08 1.957 2.595 2.07 1.69 2.18 0.52 
DCP Contribute 3.72 1.64 6.08 3.74 3.81 2.83 1.85 
        
Panel B: Median Comparison, by Firm Leverage 
 All  Group1 Group2 Group3 Group4 Group5 Group6 
Firm Leverage 0.145 0.000 0.036 0.149 0.248 0.377 0.644 
CEO Leverage 0.060 0.000 0.037 0.131 0.153 0.085 0.056 
INVESTMENT 0.079 0.110 0.082 0.070 0.070 0.062 0.080 
GROWTH 0.025 0.090 0.028 0.020 0.017 0.018 0.011 
Tobins Q 1.428 1.976 1.392 1.415 1.360 1.276 1.466 
Z-SCORE 4.453 19.250 18.912 5.611 3.672 2.313 1.073 
Bond Rating AA AAA AAA A BBB BBB BB 
DtD 2.643 2.306 2.634 2.799 2.842 2.515 2.011 
Pi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 2.319 
EPS 1.380 0.850 1.605 1.750 1.770 1.225 0.170 
ROA 0.048 0.075 0.048 0.055 0.050 0.032 0.005 
ROE 0.120 0.113 0.129 0.132 0.120 0.104 0.007 
DCP withdraw 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cash-out rate% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DCP Contribute 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Note: 
CEO leverage is (Pension+DCP) divided by (Pesion+DCP+CEO equity value). Leverage equals 
total long-term dent divided by total assets (book value). Investment the sum of R&D expenditure 
and capital expenditure divided by book value total assets. Growth is the ratio of the research and 
development expenditures to total sales. Tobins Q is estimated by market value of total assets over 
book value of total assets. Z-score is based on Altman (1968). Estimation of DTD (Distance-to-
Default) see Sundaram and Yermack(2006). Estimation of Pi (Expected Default Frequency) in 
percent by KMV-Merton Model see Bharath and Shumway (2008). ROA= Net Income/Total 
Assets. ROE= Net Income/Book Value of Equity. DCP withdraw is the amount withdrawn from 
DCP during the year. Cash out rate is DCP withdraw over the DCP total balance. DCP contribute 
is executive contributions to DCP over executive annual total compensation. 
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The next paragraph show these 55 firms may be under financial distress. 
Aggressive investment and financial distress together is a strong sign of sever assets 
substitution/risk shifting problem. Therefore it is not the lower agency cost of debt 
drive the downward of the CEO leverage. 
I observe strong evidence shows that firms in group 6 are under financial distress. 
Table 12 shows that group 6 has the lowest Altman Z-score (lower than 1.8) and 
lowest bond rating, which means the highest probability of going bankrupt. The 
distance-to-default and expected- default-frequency using the KMV-Merton model 
also show consistent conclusions. Group 6 furthermore consistently show low ROA 
and the lowest ROE and EPS. All these evidences point to one conclusion: Firms in 
group 6 are under serious financial distress. 
High firm leverage, low CEO leverage, aggressive investment, low bond rating 
and financial distress, theses four aspects give us a big picture of these 55 firms: 
Managerial incentives are not aligned against asset substitution when the firm enters 
financial distress. This might suggest that the inside debt mechanism is not that 
effective and the non-positive relation is suboptimal. 
5.5 ENDOGENEITY OF FIRM LEVERAGE 
Endogeneity is perhaps the most considerable problem plaguing researchers in 
empirical corporate finance. Firm leverage is a typical endogenous variable in 
literature. In the analyses above, I follow the previous studies in inside debt and 
assume that CEO inside debt compensation is exogenously determined. However, it is 
possible that inside debt contracts/agreements and corporate debt contracts are 
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endogenously determined by some unobservable firm-specific factors. For example, 
firms in short of cash flow are more likely to compensate CEOs with inside debt 
(which requires less current cash) and less likely to refinance by corporate debt. On 
the other hand, CEOs with high inside debt have the potential to adjust firm leverage 
and firms’ risk to maximize the value of inside debt. So that low-leveraged firms are 
associated with a higher CEO inside debt ratio. In such a case, the causation goes from 
high inside debt ratio to low leverage, and not vice versa. 
Previous literature in inside debt research largely omitted the endogeneity of firm 
leverage and inside debt caused by joint determination and reverse causality. When 
endogeneity exists, the coefficient estimates from the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
will be biased and inconsistent. Here I take the endogeneity bias into account and 
perform the following tests to alleviate the endogeneity concerns. 
5.5.1 Effect of Changes in the CEO Inside Debt Ratio on Change in Leverage 
To eliminate the concern of endogeneity bias, I first examine the effect of changes in 
the CEO inside debt ratio on the change in leverage. There are some advantages to 
using this approach. First, given that firm characteristics are constant over a certain 
period, I can control for the effect of unobserved firm characteristics on a firm’s 
leverage. Second, as firms do not adjust their capital structure frequently, I am more 
likely to pick up the effects of changes in the CEO inside debt ratio on capital 
structure by examining the co-variation of these changes. 
In order to test the effect of changes in the CEO inside debt ratio on change in 
leverage, I construct a model in which the dependent variable is the change of a firm’s 
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debt ratio from year t-1 to t, and the independent variables are the changes in the 
explanatory variables from year t-2 to t-1. Among these independent variables, the 
primary explanatory variable is the year-to-year changes in the CEO inside debt ratio. 
Only one-year-lagged change is captured since the sample only has two year (2007, 
2008) period.  
∆Leveragei,t = ∆Log(Size) i,t-1+ ∆Tangibility i,t-1 + ∆MTB i,t-1 + ∆Profitability i,t-1 + 
∆R&D
 i,t-1+∆SE i,t-1 +∆NDTS i,t-1+∆(CEO inside debt ratio) i,t-1 
Leverage is measured by long-term debt plus short-term debt over total asset 
(book value).Size is measured by total sales. Tangibility is measured by net property, 
plant and equipment to total assets. MTB is market-to-book value. Profitability is 
ROA measured by EBITA to total assets. R&D is the research and development 
expense to total sales. SE is selling expenses over sales and NDTS is the Non-Debt 
Tax Shields. The detailed estimation of NDTS can be found at Titman and Wessels 
(1988). CEO inside debt ratio is CEO total inside debt divided by (inside debt + equity 
value).The results are reported in Table 13 Column one.  
The result of significant negative coefficient on changes in CEO inside debt 
means that changes in CEO inside debt ratio have significant explaining power on 
future changes in firm leverage. This suggests endogeneity between inside debt ratio 
and firm leverage caused by reverse causality. The next section shows the treatment. 
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TABLE 13: Effect of Changes in Inside Debt Ratio on Firm Leverage 
Dependent variable: Leverage change  
(OLS) 
Leverage change 
(IV) 
Firm size change (Log(sales)) 0.003** 0.0007*** 
 (2.12) (2.85) 
Asset tangibility (PPE/total asset) 0.030 0.182*** 
 (0.55) (15.5) 
Market-to-Book value  0.092*** 0.002 
 (2.97) (0.19) 
Profitability(ROA)  0.034 -0.081*** 
 (0.64) (-7.01) 
(R&D/sales)  -0.036 0.027*** 
 (-0.84) (3.07) 
Selling expenses over sales  0.009 -0.018*** 
 (0.43) (-4.1) 
Non-debt tax shield -0.066 0.039*** 
 (-1.22) (3.41) 
CEO inside debt ratio -0.032** -0.0002 
 (-2.05) (-0.07) 
R-Square 0.0146 0.202 
Obs No. 1367 1256 
Note: 
Column one is the result of testing the reverse causality from CEO inside debt to firm leverage, 
using the actual firm leverage. Column two is the result of testing the efficiency of the instrumental 
variable regression, using the predicated leverage from the instrumental variable regression. 
Leverage is measured by long-term debt plus short-term debt over total asset (book value).Size is 
measured by total sales. Tangibility is measured by net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets. MTB is market-to-book value. Profitability is ROA measured by EBITA to total assets. 
R&D is the research and development expense to total sales. SE is selling expenses over sales and 
NDTS is the Non-Debt Tax Shields. The detailed estimation of NDTS can be found at Titman and 
Wessels (1988). CEO inside debt ratio is CEO total inside debt divided by (inside debt + equity 
value). T-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 
and 10% (*) levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  60 
5.5.2 Efficiency of the Instrument Variable 
I follow the literature and adopt instrumental variable regression approach to address 
the endogeneity. The instrument variable I selected is the asset tangibility, which is 
widely used by literature in firm leverage research. Asset tangibility is measured by 
Property, Plant and Equipment divided by Total assets.   
To test the efficiency of the instrument variable in alleviating the endogeneity 
problem, I conduct a two stage least square test. 
First stage:   Leverageit = Tangibilityit + Xit 
Second stage: ∆Leveragei,t = ∆Log(Size) i,t-1+ ∆Tangibility i,t-1 + ∆MTB i,t-1 + 
∆Profitability
 i,t-1 + ∆(R&D dummy) i,t-1+ ∆R&D i,t-1+∆SE i,t-1 +∆NDTS i,t-1+∆(CEO 
inside debt ratio)
 i,t-1 
In the first stage, I used tangibility as an instrument to predict firm leverage. Xit is 
a set of exogenous variables used to estimate the determinants of inside debt:  Firm 
size, CEO tenure, Growth, Liquidity (cash flow status), Tax status, Firm age, board 
size, board independence, CEO duality. Industrial dummies (first SIC digit) and year 
dummies are also included to capture industry effect and time effect. 
In the second stage, I re-visit the dynamic effect of lagged inside debt ratio 
change on firm leverage change in section 5.5.1. If the instrumental variable in the 
first stage can efficiently alleviate the endogeneity problem, I expect the impact of 
inside debt ratio on future firm leverage disappears. The results of the two-stage least 
square test are reported in Table 13 Column two. The results of the first stage 
regression are shown in Table 14. 
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TABLE 14: Results of the First Stage Regression of the 2SLS Regression 
Dependent variable: Actual firm leverage 
Asset tangibility 0.210*** 
 (18.78) 
CEO tenure with the firm -0.002 
 (-0.72) 
CEO hired from outside indicator 0.007 
 (1.22) 
Firm size 0.018*** 
 (9.67) 
Liquidity 0.015* 
 (1.77) 
Growth 0.026*** 
 (7.05) 
Tax status indicator 0.045*** 
 (8.8) 
Years since founding of firms -1.6E-05 
 (-0.1) 
Percentage of top5 institutional 
holdings 
0.002*** 
 (6.99) 
Founder CEO indicator -0.002 
 (-0.35) 
Board size -0.016 
 (-1.25) 
Percentage of outside directors 0.084*** 
 (2.7) 
Obs NO. 4673 
R-Square 0.1229 
Note: 
I perform a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions to address endogeneity of firm leverage. 
Asset tangibility is used as an instrumental variable for firm leverage. The other control variables 
are taken from the model estimating the impact of firm leverage on inside debt in Table 7 and 
Table 8.With the instrumental variable approach, the predicted firm leverage from the first-stage 
regression is no longer correlated with the error term of the second-stage regression, so the 
estimated coefficient will be consistent.T-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Results show that the coefficient of inside debt ratio change in the second stage 
becomes insignificant after the instrument variable is used. This suggests that the 
instrument statistically resolves reverse causality and it can be used to re-visit the 
determinants of inside debt problem. 
5.5.3 Two-stage Least Squares Regression 
The results in previous section show the evidence of endogeneity problem between 
inside debt and firm leverage. It also shows that asset tangibility is an efficient 
instrumental variable to alleviate the endogeneity.  Here I perform another two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regressions to re-visit the study questions of the determinant of 
inside debt in section 5.3. 
In the first-stage regression, I still use an OLS model to predict the firm leverage 
using asset tangibility as the instrumental variable. In the second-stage regression, I 
regress the CEO inside debt and its components on the predicted firm leverage from 
the first-stage regression and the other control variables. Thus, with this approach, the 
predicted firm leverage from the first-stage regression is no longer correlated with the 
error term of the second-stage regression, so the estimated coefficient will be 
consistent. 
I specify the two-stage model as follows: 
First stage: Leverageit = Tangibilityit +Ln(ASSETS)it + Ln(CEO TENURE)it + 
LIQUIDITYit + GROWTHit+ TAXit + YEARSit + OUTSIDEit + Xit  
Second stage: Yit = Fitted_LEVit +Ln(ASSETS)it + Ln(CEO TENURE)it + 
LIQUIDITYit + GROWTHit+ TAXit + YEARSit + OUTSIDEit + Xit  
In the first stage, I use the asset tangibility as the instrument variable to predict 
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firm leverage (Fitted_LEV). Xit represents all other control variables including board 
size, board independence, and other CEO characteristics. 
In the second stage, I use the predicted value of firm leverage from the first stage 
(Fitted_LEV) as a proxy of firm leverage and regress CEO inside debt on Fitted_LEV 
and other control variables. Here Yit represents inside debt and its components: 
pension value, deferred compensation balance, total inside debt, CEO leverage ratio 
and firm match rate.  Xit still represents all other control variables including board 
size, board independence, and other CEO characteristics. Regression results are 
reported in Table 15. Since the results of the first stage is the same as shown in Table 
14. Here I only report the results of the second stage. 
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TABLE 15: Tobit Regression of CEO Inside Debt on Firm Leverage-Revisit 
Panel A Basic Model Without Quadratic Term Of Predicted Firm Leverage 
Dependent variable: Pension DCP Pension+DCP (Pension+DCP)/ 
CEO equity value 
Firm match rate 
Intercept -53.418*** -31.766*** -52.296*** -1.015*** -4.364*** 
 (-10.63) (-8.3) (-10.95) (-8.09) (-6.58) 
CEO tenure with the firm 1.439*** 1.600*** 2.467*** -0.004 0.078 
 (3.85) (5.2) (6.46) (-0.38) (1.55) 
CEO hired from outside indicator -0.764 -0.951* -1.662** -0.029 -0.169* 
 (-1.12) (-1.7) (-2.37) (-1.54) (-1.84) 
Firm size 2.138*** 1.844*** 3.128*** 0.029*** 0.107*** 
 (7.11) (7.4) (10.06) (3.44) (2.6) 
Leverage -6.280 2.147 -3.984 0.206 1.621* 
 (-0.89) (0.38) (-0.56) (1.08) (1.75) 
Liquidity -2.490* -0.639 -1.145 0.027 -0.355** 
 (-1.87) (-0.64) (-0.91) (0.82) (-2) 
Growth -12.768*** -6.081** -11.282*** -0.361*** -1.413** 
 (-3.23) (-2.14) (-3.1) (-3.77) (-2.37) 
Tax status indicator 0.348 -0.273 -0.022 0.019 0.051 
OBS# 1283 1283 1283 1283 1283 
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TABLE 15: Tobit Regression of CEO Inside Debt on Firm Leverage – Revisit (Continued) 
Panel B Basic Model With Quadratic Term Of Predicted Firm Leverage 
Dependent variable: Pension DCP Pension+DCP (Pension+DCP)/ 
CEO equity value 
Firm match rate 
Intercept -57.744*** -32.664*** -53.695*** -1.151*** -4.644*** 
 (-10.5) (-7.96) (-10.53) (-8.59) (-6.4) 
CEO tenure with the firm 1.125*** 1.539*** 2.216*** -0.007 0.060 
 (2.95) (4.85) (5.66) (-0.72) (1.16) 
CEO hired from outside indicator -0.937 -0.989* -1.782** -0.033* -0.179** 
 (-1.39) (-1.76) (-2.55) (-1.77) (-1.96) 
Firm size 1.916*** 1.801*** 3.000*** 0.023*** 0.096** 
 (6.36) (7.14) (9.57) (2.77) (2.32) 
Leverage 78.377** 21.321 35.718 2.906*** 6.866* 
 (2.42) (0.85) (1.15) (3.54) (1.63) 
Liquidity -2.372* -0.632 -1.126 0.028 -0.349* 
 (-1.79) (-0.63) (-0.9) (0.87) (-1.96) 
Growth -11.835*** -5.903** -10.507*** -0.352*** -1.380** 
 (-3.02) (-2.07) (-2.89) (-3.69) (-2.31) 
Tax status indicator 0.016 -0.354 -0.142 0.005 0.032 
 (0.02) (-0.62) (-0.2) (0.26) (0.34) 
Liquidity^2 -197.112*** -44.710 -94.555 -6.267*** -12.128 
 (-2.75) (-0.8) (-1.37) (-3.42) (-1.32) 
CEO Duality 2.614*** 0.495 1.972*** 0.033* 0.147* 
 (4.08) (0.93) (2.99) (1.86) (1.69) 
OBS# 1283 1283 1283 1283 1283 
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TABLE 15: Tobit Regression of CEO Inside Debt on Firm Leverage-Revisit (Continued) 
Note: 
Tobit regression estimates of inside debts and its components- revisit with the predicted firm leverage from the instrument variable regression. Panel 
A is the model without quadratic term of firm leverage and Panel B is the model with quadratic term of firm leverage. To avoid the clustering effect, I 
take the mean of each variable for each case across time and running regression on the collapsed dataset of means. Pension is the aggregate actuarial 
present value of the executive's accumulated pension benefit. DCP is the aggregate balance in non-tax-qualified deferred compensation plans. CEO 
equity value equals the value of common stock plus stock options, calculated according to the estimated market value at fiscal year end. Firm match 
rate is the ratio of firm match contribution and executive contribution to deferred compensation account. Leverage equals total long-term dent divided 
by total debt plus the book value (or market value) of equity. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm has negative operating cash flow. Growth is the ratio of the research and development expenditures to total sales. Tax status is 
an indicator variable equals one if the firm has net operating loss carry forwards on its balance sheet. Other control variables are skipped to save space, 
they are: firm age, institutional holdings, Founder CEO Indicator, Board size, Percentage of outside directors. The coefficients of these skipped 
variables are similar to those in Table 7 and Table 8.T-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% 
(*) levels. 
  67 
Results in Table 15 show that after accounting for the endogeneity, the main 
findings are still consistent with the results from OLS estimation: the inverted U-shape 
still exists on CEO pension, CEO inside debt ratio and firm match rate.  Firm 
leverage still show no impact on CEO deferred compensation and total inside debt 
after controlling for endogeneity. The new results have two substantial differences 
from the old results. First, new results suggest that firm leverage only show significant 
impact on inside debt in quadratic models. This is consistent with univariate results in 
section 4.1(Table 5 and Figure 5) and further confirms the finding of the non-linear 
inverted U-shape relation. Second, the new results show that, unlike 5% in old results, 
there are around 18% firms in the range of negative firm leverage-CEO inside debt 
relation. The turn point leverage goes down to 35% instead of 54%. This suggests that, 
as shown in Table 12, both group 5 and group 6 are under the range of declining CEO 
inside debt ratios. In Table 12, actually the CEO inside debt ratio does start to decline 
after group 4. 
The impact of firm leverage on CEO Contribution to DCP still shows no 
significance. Unlike the insignificant negative coefficients in Table 10, the coefficients 
of the estimated firm leverage show insignificant positive. I skip the results to save 
space.  
I also re-visit the dynamic change of CEO Contribution to DCP. Unlike the 
results in Table 11, the new results in Table 16 show that the firm leverage losses its 
dynamic impact on CEO contribution to DCP after the endogeneity is accounted for. 
This is consistent with the cross-sectional results in Table 15 or old results in Table 7. 
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TABLE 16: Regression on Dynamic Change of CEO Contribution - Revisit 
Dependent Variable: Change of contribution rate 
Firm size 0.050*** 
 (4.37) 
Leverage -0.013 
 (-1.35) 
Liquidity -0.014 
 (-0.55) 
Growth -0.002 
 (-0.18) 
Tax 0.053** 
 (2.02) 
Institutional holdings 0.078*** 
 (7.09) 
CEO equity value 0.103*** 
 (6.36) 
ROA 0.048*** 
 (4.11) 
Stock return 0.040*** 
 (3.32) 
Return on DCP 0.085*** 
 (4.21) 
Obs # 4330 
R-Square 0.075 
Note: 
OLS regression estimates of CEO contribution rate to DCP-revisit with the predicted firm leverage 
from the instrument variable regression. To study the dynamic decision of contribution rate, I take 
the dynamic change of each variable and normalize them into dummy variables: one if increase 
and zero otherwise. I run regression on the dataset of these dummies. CEO contribution rate is the 
ratio of the annual executive contribution to DCP and annual cash compensation. Leverage equals 
total long-term dent divided by total debt plus the book value (or market value) of equity. Firm size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
has negative operating cash flow. Growth is the ratio of the research and development expenditures 
to total sales. Tax status is an indicator variable equals one if the firm has net operating loss carry 
forwards on its balance sheet. CEO equity value equals the market value of common stock plus 
stock options at fiscal year end. ROA is the ratio of net operating income to the book value of 
assets. Stock return is the annual return on common equity (monthly compounded). Return on 
DCP is estimated by dividing the earnings on DCP by deferred compensation balance in the 
beginning of that fiscal year. T-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. Significant at 
1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Over all, after accounting for the endogeneity of firm leverage, I find that the 
inverted U-shape relation between firm leverage and CEO inside debt ratio still exists. 
The new actual firm leverage turn point of this inverted U-shape goes down to 35% if 
the predicted firm leverage is mapped to the actual firm leverage. There are around 
18% high leveraged firms are within the range of negative firm leverage-inside debt 
ratio relation. Firm leverage still does not show significant impact on CEO annual 
deferred compensation decisions. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
Prior to now, empirical studies in CEO compensation have almost entirely overlooked 
the inside debt compensation due to data unavailability. Before 2006, CEO pension 
was the only proxy for inside debt compensation. The SEC’s new disclosure rule in 
2006 enabled researchers to look inside the black box of deferred compensation, 
which is another important part of inside debt. This paper documents the newly 
available information on inside debt disclosures and studies its determinants and 
implications in CEO compensation and agency problems. 
Using the new disclosed deferred compensation data, I find that deferred 
compensation is as important as pensions in terms of its market values to CEOs’ total 
compensation. Unlike that of Sundaram and Yermack, the univariate and regression 
analysis in this paper does not observe the linear positive association between firm 
leverage and CEO pension. Instead, I find an inverted U-shape relation: CEOs in the 
middle-leverage firms have higher inside debt holdings than both in low-leverage 
firms and high-leverage firms. Further univariate analysis suggests that the underlying 
reason is related to firm financial distress and CEO risk aversion.  
I find that firm leverage has no impact on CEO deferred compensation decisions. 
The main factors that affect the amount or ratio of contribution to CEOs’ deferred 
compensation account are firm size, liquidity status, default risk and CEO wealth. 
These results suggest that high equity holding makes the CEO an owner-manager so 
that the CEO mainly retains equity interest in the firm. Therefore CEOs with high 
equity holdings are less interested in inside debt holdings. 
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The above findings are still robust even after considering for the endogeneity of 
firm leverage. 
The results of this paper also shed light on how CEO power and board 
monitoring efficiency affects inside debt compensation. I find a positive association 
between inside debt components and CEO power and a negative association with 
board efficiency. These results in some degree support the view that inside debt can be 
used by the managers to extract additional rents (Gerakos (2007)). 
This study makes three main contributions. First, it is the first empirical study 
that documents the use of executive deferred compensation in large public U.S. firms. 
Second, it shows a non-linear relationship between firm leverage and executive inside 
debt holding. Third, it provides supportive evidence of the arguments that inside debt 
can be used to extract additional rents and an owner-manager favor equity interest 
rather than the income tax benefit of inside debt. 
For the future research in this topic, the most important and interesting part will 
be testing and investigating possible reasons of inverted U-shape agent cost pattern. 
Based on the data sample, there are still 52% firms do not provide CEO defined 
pension and 33% firms do not provide deferred compensation plans to CEOs. There 
fore, a second question may deserve more attention is why firms provide or not 
provide inside debt. Last but not least, how CEO inside debt holdings relate to firm 
performance is also unknown. The main challenge in this problem may be the 
endogeneity between the compensation and firm performance.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MANAGERIAL RISK PREFERENCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
VOLATILITY: NEW EVIDENCE FROM EXECUTIVE DEFERRED 
COMPENSATION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
How does managerial preference for risk affects risk characteristics of the firm? This 
chapter provides empirical evidence of a strong relation between managerial risk 
taking preference and firm performance volatility (stock return volatility, ROA 
volatility and asset value volatility).  
CEOs have different managerial styles and risk preferences. The differences in 
CEOs’ personal risk preferences affect their firm performance through different firm 
policies. This is a prevailing perception in academic research. While a CEO’s risk 
preference is not directly observable, the existing literature has considered two 
possible indirect measures of managerial risk preference: CEO compensation scheme 
and CEO personal characteristics. Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest that management’s 
risk aversion can be affected by the design of compensation contracts. To proxy the 
managerial risk preference, the first stream uses either the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity (Garen (1994), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006)) or the variance of compensation (Frank Moers and Erik Peek (2000)) as the 
measures of managerial risk aversion. Another stream uses managerial stock options 
as the proxy of managerial risk measure (DeFusco et al. (1990); Tufano (1996); Guay 
(1997); Core and Guay (2000)). More recent literature turns to the characteristic of 
CEOs portfolios (Carpenter (2000); Cohen, Hall and Viceira (2000); Rogers (2001); 
Abdel-khalik (2006); Brisley (2004)).  
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However, the methodology of using executive compensation as a measure of risk 
aversion is based on risk-neutral valuation. To the degree that the risk aversion of 
CEOs decreases their personal valuation of stock options, the methodology may yield 
inaccurate estimates (Lambert et al. (1991)). This might be the reason why the relation 
between CEO risk-taking incentive and firm risk is very weak and not widely 
supported by cross-sectional studies. Moreover, the endogeneity among managerial 
incentives, risk, and performance makes this methodology even noisier (Palia (2001); 
Low (2009)). 
Alternatively, prior literature also attempts to use managerial personal 
characteristics (such as age, personal income, wealth, education and gender) to 
estimate their risk aversion (e.g., Wang and Hanna (1997); Grable (2000); Donkers et 
al (2001); Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (2001)). However, critics argue that the history or 
previous characteristics of CEO are irrelevant and might not be a good measure to 
predict CEO’s talent and risk preference in his current employer firm (Wang (2009)). 
To avoid the weak relation, endogeneity and irrelevance problem in previous 
literature, I turn to look for exogenous variables that can reflect CEO’s current risk 
aversion preference. The investment of CEO inside debt deferrals and the meltdown of 
financial markets in 2008 provide a unique opportunity which enables us to use this 
novel natural experiment to study the CEO risk aversion and firm risk exogenously.  
In firms that provide deferred compensation plans (DCPs thereafter) to their 
named executives, CEOs are allowed to select the investment options for their 
deferred compensation account. The investment options usually include various bonds, 
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mutual funds and stock mutual funds. The portfolio allocation between bond mutual 
fund (riskless investment) and stock mutual fund (risky investment) should reflect 
CEOs risk preference (Schooley and Worden (1996)). But the 2006 new SEC 
disclosure rules do not require firms to report the CEO’s portfolio allocation of their 
deferred compensation investment. Without further disclosure, there is no way to 
know CEOs’ investment choices. However, the 2008 financial crisis allows us to 
estimate the CEOs’ portfolio allocation into risky investment and riskless investment. 
During the financial crisis in 2008, the financial markets melted down and nearly all 
stocks and stock related mutual funds receive negative returns. If a CEO invested most 
of his deferrals in risky investment, say stock mutual funds, I should observe negative 
return to his/her deferred compensation account in 2008. In contrast, a risk-averse 
CEO who puts his/her deferrals mainly in riskless investment would enjoy relatively 
higher or positive return in 2008. I will therefore use low return realization to the 
compensation plan in 2008 as a measure for the relative risk aversion of the CEO.  
Using this novel natural experiment data and new proxy of CEO risk aversion, I 
provide new evidence on the relationship between CEO risk preference and the 
volatility of firm performance measures (stock return, earnings and operating cash 
flows). My results show that a negative association exists between the CEO risk 
aversion and the volatility of firm market performance. This means that firms whose 
CEOs have positive return on DCP in year 2008 have relatively lower market 
performance volatility than firms whose CEOs have negative return on DCP. This 
result is robust even after controlling for sample selection bias. I also find that firms 
providing DCP plans to CEOs have lower performance volatility. This result is 
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consistent with Sundaram and Yermack(2006). For the other control variables, I find 
that stock-return volatility is significantly related to firm size, Tobin’s Q, Institutional 
Holdings.  Nevertheless, firm size, industry segments, R&D investment, CEO pay-
for-performance sensitivity have significant power to explain firm risk in term of ROA 
volatility and asset value volatility.  
After controlling for sample selection bias, I find that firms with risk-averse 
CEOs perform better than other firms in terms of stock return, ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Further, I show that this positive correlation is mainly driven by year 2008. This 
suggests that risk-averse CEO may lead firm to perform better than others in bad 
market year. However, in good years this correlation is not significant.  
I do not find evidence of firms with DCPs perform better than those without 
DCPs. Instead, I find that firms with DCPs have lower Tobin’s Q than other firms. 
This result is consistent with Wei and Yermack (2010)’s findings. Wei and Yermack 
(2010), find an overall reduction of enterprise value when a CEO’s deferred 
compensation holdings are large. 
This study makes four main contributions. First, it is the first empirical study that 
uses natural experiment data to examine the CEO risk preference and firm risk relation. 
Previous studies in this field largely omitted the natural experiment method and 
suffered from weak relation, endogeneity and irrelevance problems. Second, this paper 
is also the first empirical study that documents the return data of CEO deferred 
compensation investment after SEC’s 2006 new disclosure rule. Third, it provides 
evidence that firms with inside debt compensation have lower firm risk and lower firm 
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market value. Four, it shows that firms with inside debt compensation have lower firm 
risk and lower firm market value. 
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows. Section 2 is the 
literature review. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 shows the 
results. Section 5 presents the conclusions. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the CEO risk preference is not an observable measure, the existing literature has 
considered two possible proxies of managerial risk preference. Ono stream use the 
CEO compensation scheme (portfolio holdings) and another stream looks at CEO 
personal characteristics (such as age, personal income, wealth, education and gender).  
The first stream argues that managers with relatively low risk aversion are anticipated 
to accept larger proportions of their compensation be made contingent on performance 
(such as stocks and options) as compared to an assured pay (such as salary). Smith and 
Stulz (1985) suggest that management’s risk aversion can be affected by the design of 
compensation contracts. They argue that given that a manager’s utility function is 
concave in expected wealth or firm value, the manager could be induced into less risk-
averse, risk-neutral, or risk-taking behavior through the different extent of convexity 
in the compensation contract.  
Pay-for-performance sensitivity is one of the major measures used to address the 
relation between risk and convexity in the compensation contract. Increasing pay-for-
performance sensitivity induces managers to reduce the overall risk of the firm so as to 
reduce their own risk exposure. 
Garen (1994) examines the relation between CEO pay-for-performance 
sensitivity and different risk measures. He finds negative relations between proxies for 
risk and pay- for-performance sensitivity. However, the statistical significance of this 
relation in his study is quite weak.  
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) test the relation between the variation of stock 
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return volatility and pay-for-performance sensitivity. They find that pay-for-
performance sensitivity declines in the level of stock return variance.  
The results from these studies suggest that equity-based compensation may not 
effectively reflect managerial risk aversion. 
Similar to the pay-for-performance sensitivity measure, and building on the linear 
principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Moers and Peek (2000) use 
two proxies for managerial risk: (1) the variance of compensation and (2) mean 
compensation divided by variance of compensation. The first measure is based on the 
assumption that risk-averse managers prefer less risk to more risk. Therefore, the 
variance of compensation should be lower for more risk-averse managers. The 
assumption of the second measure is that risk-averse managers demand a risk 
premium. Therefore, the ratio of the mean compensation to the variance of 
compensation should be higher for more risk-averse managers. Moers and Peek’s 
study finds that the use of performance measures in executive compensation contracts 
decreases as the level of risk aversion increases. 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) consider the impact of higher pay-for-
performance sensitivity on future firm volatility for a large sample and find (contrary 
to my primary results) that higher pay-for-performance sensitivity is associated with 
increases in firm volatility.    
Another stream of literature argues that executive stock options create incentives 
for executives to manage firms in ways that maximize firm market value (DeFusco et 
al. (1990)).  Since options increase in value with the volatility of the underlying stock, 
  83 
executive stock options provide managers with incentives to take actions that increase 
firm risk. Therefore researches in this stream simply use the value (or portion) of stock 
options or the characteristics of the stock option compensation as measures of 
managerial risk aversion.  
Tufano (1996) finds that the value of executive stock holdings and the number of 
stock options held by managers significantly affect the hedging by gold mining firms. 
Guay (1999) finds that firms appear to grant options more frequently in companies 
with growth opportunities to increase risk-taking. Core and Guay (2002) propose a 
methodology for measuring the CEO risk-taking incentive effects arising from 
executive stock and option holdings. This methodology is widely used by recent 
empirical research to estimate CEO risk-taking preference. 
Rogers (2002) uses such a proxy variable measured with observed characteristics 
of CEO portfolios of stock and option holdings to study how CEO portfolio structure 
affects corporate derivatives usage. Abdel-khalik (2006) uses the extent to which 
compensation choice is made up of stock-based awards (such as stock options) as a 
measure of CEO risk aversion. His paper shows a negative relationship between CEO 
risk aversion and the volatility of performance measure. The results support the 
argument that high risk-averse CEOs act to reduce volatility. Brisley (2006) shows 
that vesting conditions of traditional Executive Stock Option plans (ESOs) 
significantly affect managers to select profitable risky projects. 
Cohen, Hall and Viceira (2000) find that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between increases in option holdings by executives and subsequent 
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increases in firm risk. They find that CEOs with option holdings that are large relative 
to their wealth and whose value is sensitive to stock-price volatility tend to increase 
the volatility of the firms.  This evidence suggests that option grants lead to greater 
stock price volatility rather than the reverse. Yet, the estimated effect on risk-taking is 
small, which means although options appear to increase firm risk, there is no evidence 
of that this effect is either large or damaging to shareholders. Carpenter (2000) 
presents simulations demonstrating that as the size of the firm increases, option 
compensation induces managers to actually moderate asset risk. This actually 
questions the effect of option compensation on managerial risk-taking. 
Moreover, the methodology of using executive stock and option holdings as a 
measure of risk aversion is based on risk-neutral valuation. To the degree that the risk 
aversion of CEOs decreases their personal valuation of stock options, the methodology 
may yield inaccurate estimates (Lambert et al. (1991)). This might be the reason why 
the relation between CEO risk-taking incentive and firm risk is very weak and not 
widely supported by cross-sectional studies. The endogeneity among managerial 
incentives, risk, and performance makes this methodology even noisier ( Palia (2001); 
Low (2009)). 
The second stream argues that the compensation component attributed to the 
individual’s risk aversion is actually a latent variable and the underling driver 
variables are those CEOs’ demographic characteristics such as age, gender, tenure, 
and wealth. Therefore the second stream uses these variables to predict CEO risk 
aversion (e.g., Wang and Hanna (1997), Grable (2000) ,Donkers et al (2001); 
Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (2001)). Wang and Hanna (1997) examine the effect of age 
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on risk tolerance and find that risk tolerance increases with age when other variables 
are controlled. Grable (2000) shows that personal risk tolerance was associated with 
being male, older, married, higher incomes, more education, more financial 
knowledge, and increased economic expectations. Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (2001) find 
that wealthier households, people with higher education, single women and African-
Americans tend to take riskier portfolios. Donkers et al (2001) also find strong links 
between risk aversion and gender, education level, and income of the individual.  
Although the above literature has merits, critics argue that the history or previous 
characteristics of CEO might not be a good measure to predict CEO’s talent and risk 
preference in his current employer firm. Wang (2009) finds no difference in long-run 
accounting performance for CEOs with different employment histories. Even though 
Wang’s paper shows that CEOs with more frequently turn-over have a propensity to 
bear risk and implement riskier firm policies, it fails to test the endogeneity and 
causality between the CEO turnover and risk taking. It is showed by Bushman, Dai 
and Wang (2010) that the probability of CEO turnover is decreasing in performance 
risk, which suggests that risk-taking CEOs are more likely to have higher turnover rate. 
Since CEO characteristics and compensation structure either show weak relation 
with firm risk or suffer from the endogeneity problem. I turn to look for exogenous 
variables that can reflect CEO’s current risk aversion. The investment of CEO inside 
debt deferrals and the meltdown of financial market in 2008 provide a unique 
opportunity which enables us to use this novel natural experiment to study the 
managerial risk aversion and firm risk.  
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Schooley and Worden (1996) argue that personal portfolio allocations (measured 
as risky assets to wealth) are reliable indicators of attitudes toward risk.  
Following Schooley and Worden (1996)’s argument, in this chapter, I take the 
advantage of the new disclosure rule of 2006 and the unique natural experiment by the 
2008 financial crisis to proxy the CEOs’ personal portfolio allocation and attitudes to 
risk. 
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3 DATA AND VARIABLES 
My research sample comes from COMPUSTAT Executive Compensation database 
from year 2006 to 2009. The database covers the S&P 1500 plus companies that were 
part of the S&P 1500 and are still trading. This results in a sample of 1744 firms and 
6723 firm years. The number of observations in the regression may be less when firms 
without accounting data in COMPUSTAT or stock return data in CRSP are eliminated. 
Within the sample firms, about 32% firms do not offer CEO deferred compensation 
plans so that I observe zero or missing return of deferred compensation investment in 
these firms. Among the firms providing DCPs, There are about 26.5% firms whose 
CEO receives positive return on DCP in year 2008. 
3.1 MEASURES OF FIRM PERFORMANCE AND VOLATILITY 
Firm Performance: ROA is the ratio of net operating income to the book value of 
assets; RET is the annual stock return (monthly compounded), TOBINS’ Q is 
measured by the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. 
Performance Volatility: I use the volatility of accounting performance (VAR_ROA), 
volatility of market performance (VAR_RET) and the volatility of firm’s asset value 
return (ASSET_VOL) that is used to estimate firms’ distance to default in KMV 
model (See Sundaram and Yermack (2006)). KMV model gets market asset values for 
public companies by using an options approach. Higher volatility of asset value return 
in KMV model implies that the market has more uncertainty on the firm's business 
value. 
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3.2 KEY VARIABLES 
DCP Return Dummy: first I estimate the return of DCP, RET_DCP. RET_DCP is the 
ratio of the earnings of DCP (DEFER_EARNINGS_TOT) over the deferred 
compensation balance (DEFER_BALANCE_TOT) in the beginning of the fiscal year. 
For firms missing fiscal year begining deferred compensation balance, I estimate them 
by subtracting the CEO contribution to DCP (DEFER_CONTRIB_EXEC_TOT), firm 
contribution to DCP (DEFER_CONTRIB_CO_TOT) and current year earnings in 
DCP (DEFER_EARNINGS_TOT) from the deferred compensation balance 
(DEFER_BALANCE_TOT) at year end. Then I separate all firms into two groups by 
their returns of DCP in 2008: Group 1 is firms whose CEOs have positive DCP return 
in 2008; Group 0 is firms whose CEOs have negative DCP return in 2008. DCP 
Return Dummy takes one if a firm belongs to Group one and zero if it belongs to 
Group zero. 
DCP Dummy: It is an indicator of DCP plan. It takes one if a CEO has deferred 
compensation account, zero if a CEO does not have deferred compensation plan. 
3.3 OTHER EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
3.3.1 Firm Characteristics 
Firm leverage: the firm leverage ratio LEVERAGE is measured as the ratio of long 
term debt to the book value of total assets. Firm Size: I use the natural logarithm of 
total sales LOGSALE to control for size effect. Growth: To measure investment 
opportunities, I use the ratio of the research and development expenditures to total 
sales, GROWTH, as a proxy for growth opportunities. Assets in Place: I include 
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VALPORT, Assets in place, which is measured by (inventory + gross plan and 
equipment)/total assets. 
3.3.2 CEO Characteristics 
Besides the return on deferred compensation investment, I include following 
variables to measure CEO’s impact on firm performance and volatility used by Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2003). Tenure: TENURE is the natural logarithm of CEO tenure. 
CEO Cash Pay: I include CEO’s cash compensation, which is the sum of salary, 
bonus and non equity incentive compensation. Pay for Performance Sensitivity (PPS): 
the ratio of CEO’s total equity value change over 1% change in share price 
3.3.3 Other Control Variables 
I include the control variables used in Sundaram and Yermack (2006) such as 
board characteristics and institutional investors. They are used to proxy the corporate 
governance quality: BOARD SIZE is the natural logarithm of the number of directors. 
CEOs of firms with larger boards are assumed to have more power because of 
increased coordination costs (Yermack 1996). OUTSIDE DIRECTORS is the 
percentage of outsiders on the board, with a higher percentage of outsiders expected to 
decrease CEO power because CEOs have more influence over the careers of insiders 
(Byrd and Hickman 1992). To measure the level and quality of institutional investor 
influence, I use TOP5_HLD, the percentage of top five institutional investors’ equity 
holdings. The institutions may serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency 
problem between shareholders and managers (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Institutional 
ownership is taken from the CDA/Spectrum database of 13Fs.  
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4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
4.1 HYPOTHESIS AND MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
I desire to study two research questions. One is whether the CEOs’ personal risk 
preference can explain the firm performance volatility. Second, I also want to ask 
whether CEO’s personal risk preference affect firm performance. Therefore I have two 
hypotheses: 
H1 Null: CEOs’ risk aversion that reflected by CEOs’ personal investment risk 
preference has no association with firm performance volatility 
H1 Alternative: CEOs’ risk aversion reflected by CEOs’ personal investment risk 
preference has association with firm performance volatility. Firms with strong risk-
averse CEOs have lower performance volatility. 
H2 Null: CEOs’ risk aversion will not affect firm performance. 
H2 Alternative: CEOs’ risk aversion will affect firm performance. Risk-taking 
CEOs are more likely to take aggressive investment to increase equity value. 
Therefore Firms with risk-taking CEOs enjoy higher stock return. However, since 
risk-taking CEOs may increase firm risk and low down debt value, its impact on the 
overall firm value is unpredictable. 
In testing the above two hypotheses, I control for other economic determinants of 
CEO risk aversion and firm performance relationship used in previous research (e.g., 
Abdel-khalik (2006); Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2008); Cohen, Hall and Viceira 
(2000)). I control for the firm size, leverage, segments, growth opportunities, and 
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Tobin’s Q. I also control for other CEO characteristics (such as tenure, pay-for-
performance sensitivity, cash compensation) and board characteristics (such as board 
size and percentage of independent directors). 
First, I estimate the following model to explain cross-sectional variation in 
performance volatility: 
(Volatility)it = Ln(SALES)it +LEVERAGEit + GROWTHit + TOBINSQit + CEO_Riskit + 
DCP_Dummyit +Xit 
Here (Volatility)it represents the volatility of performance measures (Stock Return, 
ROA, and return of asset value), Xit represents the vector of other control variables 
including institutional holdings, firm segments, CEO tenure, CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity, CEO cash pay. 
Second, I include the CEO_Risk and DCP_Dummy into the following classic 
performance estimation model to see whether these two variables have explanatory 
power to cross-sectional variation in performance: 
(Performance)it = Ln(SALES)it +LEVERAGEit + GROWTHit + CEO_Riskit + DCP_Dummyit 
+Xit 
Here (Performance)it represents the performance measures (Stock Return, ROA, and 
Tobin’s Q), Xit represents the vector of other control variables including institutional 
holdings, firm segments, board size, board independency, CEO tenure, CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity, CEO cash pay. 
Third, since CEO_Risk might reveal smart or risk aversion, to distinguish one 
from the other, I conduct a univariate analysis on CEOs’ return on DCP by CEO_Risk 
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groups. Using return on DCP in 2008, I separate CEOs into two groups: Group one if 
the CEO has positive return in 2008, Group zero if the CEO has negative return in 
2008. Here I exclude the firms without DCP plans. I compare the other years’ return 
on DCP of these two groups. If CEOs in Group one is smarter than CEOs in Group 
zero, I expect to see that group one consistently has higher return on deferrals for the 
other years. Otherwise, if Group one is more risk-averse than Group zero, I should 
observe Group one consistently has lower return on deferrals in years when stock 
market is good. The variable definitions are listed in Table 17 and Table 18 shows 
their description of statistics. 
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TABLE 17: Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Return on DCP: The ratio of earnings on DCP over the DCP balance in the year 
beginning (in %).  
ROA: The ratio of net operating income to the book value of total assets. 
RET: The annual stock return (monthly compounded)=(1+ excess return) 
RET_LAG: Lagged annual stock return 
Tobin’s Q: The ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total 
assets.  
VAR_ROA: The variance of annual ROA using previous five years ROA 
change.  
VAR_RET: The variance of annual stock return (five spanning years).  
ASSET_VOL: The volatility of firm’s asset value returns that is used to estimate 
firms’ distance to default in KMV model (See Sundaram and 
Yermack (2006) for the estimation method).  
Leverage: The ratio of long term debt to the book value of total assets. 
SEG_NUM: The number of industry segments.  
Assets in place: (inventory + gross plan and equipment)/total assets.  
TOP5_HLD: The percentage of top five institutional investors’ equity holdings.  
Board size: The natural logarithm of the number of directors.  
OUT_PCT: The percentage of outsiders on the board.  
CEO tenure: The natural logarithm of CEO tenure.  
CEO cash pay: The sum of salary, bonus and non equity incentive compensation 
(in million).  
CEO PPS: Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity is the ratio of CEO’s total equity 
value change (in million) over 1% change in share price.  
DCP return dummy: It takes one if the firm’s CEO has positive DCP return in 2008, 
zero if negative, missing if no DCP.  
DCP dummy: It takes one if a CEO has deferred compensation account, zero if a 
CEO does not have deferred compensation plan. 
CEO duality It takes one if the CEO is also the chairman of board, zero if not 
Founder CEO It takes one if the CEO is one of the founders of the firm, zero if 
not 
Outside It takes one if the CEO is hired outside the firm, zero if the CEO is 
hired inside the firm 
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TABLE 18: Descriptive Statistics of all Variables 
Variable Obs# Mean Std Dev 1
st
 
Quartile Median 
3rd 
Quartile 
Return on DCP 3275 3.658 24.105 -2.269 5.362 12.147 
Tobin’s Q 6723 1.822 2.425 1.092 1.408 2.030 
ROA 5786 0.133 0.155 0.086 0.132 0.190 
RET 6400 1.100 0.773 0.743 1.028 1.298 
VAR_ROA 5472 0.475 3.760 0.021 0.076 0.254 
VAR_RET 5952 0.263 1.869 0.020 0.054 0.145 
ASSET_VOL 5200 39.83 18.457 28.700 36.690 47.120 
Log(sales) 6708 7.373 1.653 6.277 7.302 8.430 
R&D/total assets 6722 0.066 0.696 0.000 0.000 0.030 
Leverage 6723 0.179 0.186 0.016 0.144 0.280 
SEG_NUM 6320 3.598 2.130 2.000 3.000 5.000 
Assets in place 6723 0.561 0.428 0.203 0.493 0.860 
TOP5_HLD 6542 0.297 0.094 0.235 0.293 0.354 
Board size 6417 2.198 0.260 2.079 2.197 2.398 
OUT_PCT 6417 0.834 0.086 0.786 0.857 0.889 
CEO tenure 6717 6.902 6.929 2.000 5.000 9.000 
CEO cash pay 6717 1.986 2.654 0.799 1.301 2.386 
CEO PPS 4608 -14.34 1270.14 0.011 0.122 0.520 
DCP return dummy 3275 0.265     
DCP dummy 6723 0.679     
Note: 
Descriptive statistics of variables related to CEO and firm characteristics for a sample of 1,744 
firms from S&P 1500 companies over 2006 to 2009. See Table 17 for the definition of the 
variables. 
4.2 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.2.1 Univariate Analysis 
I first compare the yearly difference of the key variables. Table 19 clearly shows that 
both the market performance and accounting performance reached the valley floor in 
2008. The return of DCP in 2008 dropped almost 200% from year 2007’s 6.3% to -
16.28%. In year 2009, both the stock return and return of DCP recovered to a new 
high, which are even better than year 2006 and 2007. However the recovery of 
operation earnings is relatively slower. The ROA of 2009 is even less than that of year 
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2008. And the volatility of ROA in 2009 is also larger than 2008. Interestingly, the 
stock return volatility in 2008 is less than the other years. This may due to the stock 
market clash and most stocks reached the bottom or trade less. Nevertheless, all three 
performance volatility indicators keep high level in 2009. This suggests that the post-
crisis market becomes more sensitive.  
The mean/median comparison by CEO_RISK groups in Table 20 show that 
group one show consistently lower performance volatility than group zero for all three 
performance measures. The mean and median comparisons of the performance show 
that there is weak difference between these two groups: Group one shows higher mean 
and median Tobin’s Q, higher mean and median ROA. The difference in stock return 
is not significant and the means and medians show opposite directions. I also find that 
group one has less investment (growth) and lower institutional holdings, the difference 
in firm leverage is not significantly big, group one has a little bit lower mean leverage 
but higher median leverage. I observe significant difference in CEO compensation 
structure. Table 20 shows that group one has higher cash pay and lower pay-for-
performance sensitivity. The above results show that CEOs in group one, which is 
defined as a risk-averse group, are more likely to adopt conservative corporate policies 
and less risky compensation structure. 
 
 
 
 
  
96
TABLE 19: Mean/median Comparison by Year 
  2006   2007   2008   2009  
Variable Obs# Mean Median Obs# Mean Median Obs# Mean Median Obs# Mean Median 
Return on DCP 698 9.649 8.937 867 6.314 5.817 860 -16.28 -15.63 850 16.209 11.178 
Tobin’s Q 1585 2.059 1.644 1733 1.977 1.537 1744 1.492 1.166 1661 1.782 1.364 
ROA 1367 0.145 0.139 1481 0.142 0.139 1501 0.134 0.132 1437 0.114 0.116 
RET 1549 1.177 1.134 1672 1.038 0.990 1632 0.641 0.616 1547 1.572 1.333 
VAR_ROA 1305 0.393 0.078 1393 0.404 0.072 1408 0.427 0.070 1366 0.676 0.084 
VAR_RET 1441 0.334 0.061 1534 0.243 0.052 1513 0.124 0.062 1464 0.360 0.044 
ASSET_VOL 1292 37.522 34.255 1346 35.818 33.000 1335 38.840 36.340 1227 47.773 44.200 
Log(sales) 1584 7.378 7.300 1727 7.371 7.285 1738 7.405 7.344 1659 7.339 7.279 
R&D/total assets 1585 0.073 0.000 1732 0.053 0.000 1744 0.079 0.000 1661 0.060 0.000 
Leverage 1585 0.166 0.130 1733 0.177 0.142 1744 0.194 0.157 1661 0.179 0.143 
TOP5_HLD 1523 0.284 0.282 1688 0.294 0.292 1706 0.304 0.300 1625 0.305 0.300 
SEG_NUM 1490 3.505 3.000 1627 3.557 3.000 1640 3.637 3.000 1563 3.691 3.000 
Assets in place 1585 0.550 0.501 1733 0.538 0.479 1744 0.569 0.499 1661 0.586 0.501 
Note: 
Mean and median comparison for a sample of 1,744 firms from S&P 1500 companies over 2006 to 2009. See Table 17 for the definition of the 
variables. 
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TABLE 20: Mean/median Comparison by CEO_RISK Group 
 DCP_Return_Dummy=0 DCP_Return_Dummy=1 
Variable Obs# Mean Std Dev Median Obs# Mean Std Dev Median 
Tobin’s Q 2406 1.573 0.750 1.339 869 1.671 0.947 1.341 
ROA 2027 0.140 0.086 0.135 692 0.151 0.097 0.138 
RET 2327 1.092 0.864 1.035 816 1.053 0.444 1.046 
VAR_ROA 1960 0.190 0.583 0.049 662 0.173 0.603 0.039 
VAR_RET 2223 0.194 2.412 0.044 784 0.102 0.268 0.039 
ASSET_VOL 1903 35.131 13.147 32.200 632 34.084 12.526 31.850 
Log(sales) 2404 8.076 1.470 7.975 867 7.890 1.426 7.770 
R&D/total assets 2406 0.025 0.062 0 869 0.016 0.057 0 
Leverage 2406 0.200 0.165 0.176 869 0.199 0.168 0.181 
TOP5_HLD 2368 0.293 0.087 0.285 846 0.286 0.096 0.279 
SEG_NUM 2259 3.843 2.185 3 776 3.666 1.770 3 
Board size 2362 2.278 0.242 2.302 839 2.285 0.221 2.302 
OUT_PCT 2362 0.850 0.078 0.875 839 0.848 0.073 0.875 
Assets in place 2406 0.601 0.426 0.567 869 0.606 0.441 0.610 
CEO tenure 2405 6.616 6.138 5 867 6.491 6.382 5 
CEO cash pay 2405 2.452 3.228 1.733 867 2.644 2.748 1.875 
CEO PPS 1741 0.367 21.239 0.158 631 -5.325 111.247 0.144 
Note: 
Mean/median comparison of the 889 firms that have DCPs over 2006 to 2009. See Table 17 for the definition of the variables. 
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I then turn to look at the firms with different DCP provisions. Group one is firms 
providing DCPs and Group zero is firms without DCPs. Results in Table 21 show that 
firms with DCPs have lower Tobin’s Q, lower stock return but higher ROA. This 
finding is consistent with Wei and Yermack (2010).I observe that based on both mean 
and median comparison, firms with DCPs have significant lower performance 
volatility for all three indicators. I also find that firms with DCPs have higher firm 
leverage, higher tangible assets (or assets in place) and lower R&D expense (or 
growth opportunity). These results in some degree support the arguments and findings 
in Sundaram and Yermack (2006). 
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TABLE 21: Mean/median Comparison by DCP_DUMMY Group 
 DCP_Dummy=0 DCP_Dummy=1 
Variable Obs# Mean Std Dev Median Obs# Mean Std Dev Median 
Tobin’s Q 2156 2.213 4.034 1.578 4567 1.637 0.933 1.354 
ROA 1947 0.115 0.232 0.126 3839 0.142 0.093 0.1343 
RET 2018 1.118 0.742 1.005 4382 1.091 0.787 1.037 
VAR_ROA 1792 1.038 6.474 0.164 3680 0.201 0.623 0.052 
VAR_RET 1810 0.412 1.677 0.087 4142 0.199 1.944 0.045 
ASSET_VOL 1639 47.281 21.131 44.750 3561 36.412 15.963 33.700 
Log(sales) 2145 6.250 1.461 6.242 4563 7.901 1.463 7.813 
Growth 2155 0.151 1.220 0.002 4567 0.025 0.066 0 
Leverage 2156 0.145 0.215 0.050 4567 0.195 0.168 0.171 
TOP5_HLD 2083 0.300 0.097 0.300 4459 0.295 0.091 0.288 
SEG_NUM 2071 3.269 2.177 3 4249 3.758 2.087 3 
Board size 1975 2.051 0.238 2.079 4442 2.263 0.242 2.302 
OUT_PCT 1975 0.810 0.092 0.833 4442 0.844 0.080 0.875 
Assets in place 2156 0.496 0.426 0.390 4567 0.590 0.425 0.558 
CEO tenure 2155 7.485 7.376 5 4562 6.627 6.691 5 
CEO cash pay 2155 1.221 1.736 0.854 4562 2.347 2.923 1.644 
CEO PPS 1461 -44.796 2254 0.088 3147 -0.211 56.901 0.144 
Note: 
Mean/median comparison of the 1,744 firms in S&P 1500 over 2006 to 2009. See Table 17 for the definition of the variables. 
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4.2.2 Cross-sectional Impact on Performance Volatility 
The cross-sectional regression results on performance volatility can be seen at Table 
22. A negative association exists between the CEO risk aversion and the firm market 
performance volatility (Stock return volatility and asset value volatility) after 
controlling for the fundamentals and other volatility drivers. This means that firms 
with CEOs that have positive return on DCP in year 2008 have relatively lower market 
performance volatility. I do not find significant association with accounting 
performance (ROA) volatility. The insignificant impact on ROA may due to earnings 
management or manipulation. But the negative coefficient is consistent with the 
market based performance volatility. 
For all three volatility measures, I find that DCP_Dummy is negatively and 
significantly correlated to performance volatility after controlling for the other 
volatility drivers. This means that firms with DCP plans have lower performance 
volatility than that of firms without DCP plans. This result is consistent with 
Sundaram and Yermack (2006). Sundaram and Yermack find that firms with higher 
CEO inside debt ratio have lower firm risk (measured by Distant-to-Default).  
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TABLE 22: Regression Results of Performance Volatility 
 VAR_RET VAR_ROA ASSET_VOL 
Log(sales) -0.1812*** -0.3722*** -0.0893*** 
 (-6.56) (-10.82) (-13.84) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0772** 0.2283*** 0.0045 
 (2.18) (5.12) (0.71) 
Leverage 0.0383 -0.4170* -0.1583*** 
 (0.2) (-1.73) (-3.55) 
TOP5_HLD 0.0114*** 0.0258*** 0.0025*** 
 (2.71) (4.79) (2.61) 
SEG_NUM 0.0212 0.0579*** 0.0114*** 
 (1.29) (2.85) (3.07) 
R&D/total assets 0.0321 0.1133 0.0434*** 
 (0.52) (1.52) (2.92) 
Assets in place -0.1213 0.0012 0.0455** 
 (-1.36) (0.19) (2.09) 
CEO tenure 0.0041 0.1829 -0.0003 
 (0.74) (1.57) (-0.21) 
CEO PPS -0.0412 0.9568** 0.0196** 
 (-1.02) (2.24) (2.02) 
CEO cash pay 7.0734 43.1134** -1.4315 
 (0.48) (2.28) (-0.43) 
DCP return dummy -0.1592* -0.3163** -0.0579** 
 (-1.68) (-2.5) (-2.34) 
DCP dummy -0.4181*** -0.5067*** -0.0674*** 
 (-4.84) (-4.75) (-3.38) 
Obs# 1363 1255 1363 
R-Squared 0.1279 0.2535 0.2716 
Note: 
OLS regression estimates of performance volatility for a sample of S&P 1500 companies over 
2006 to 2009. To avoid the clustering effect, I take the mean of each variable for each case 
across time and running regression on the collapsed dataset of means. See Table 17 for the 
definition of the variables.T-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. Significant 
at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
 
For the other control variables, I find that stock-return volatility is significantly 
related to firm size, Tobin’s Q, and institutional holdings.  Nevertheless, firm size, 
segments, R&D investment, CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity have significant 
power to explain firm risk in term of ROA volatility and asset value volatility. Here 
firm size (measured by Ln(sales)) shows positive association with market based 
volatility (stock return volatility and asset market value volatility) but negative 
association with accounting based volatility(ROA volatility). These results suggest 
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that larger firms are more likely to have higher income volatility but lower stock 
return volatility. It is consistent with prior studies. Abdel-khalik(2006) find positive 
correlation between firm size and earnings volatility; Meanwhile, Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006) find that log(sales) has negative impact on firms daily stock return 
volatility.  
4.2.3 Cross-sectional Impact on Performance  
Table 23 shows the cross-sectional regression results on performance. I find weak 
evidence of firms with risk-averse CEOs performing better than other firms in terms of 
stock return. Suspecting the results are largely affected by averaging, I then run 
regression for each year from 2007 to 2009. The regression results on yearly data in 
Table 24 show that actually, the positive correlation is mainly driven by year 2008. In 
contrast, I find negative impact of CEO risk aversion on stock return in year 2009. The 
sign for year 2007 is not significant. The ambiguous sign of CEO risk aversion proxy 
suggests that risk-averse CEOs may lead firms perform better than others in bad year 
or during financial crisis. However, in good years firms with conservative CEOs may 
suffer from less return than the other firms. 
I do not find evidence of firms with DCPs perform better than those without 
DCPs. Instead, I find that firms with DCPs have lower Tobin’s Q than other firms. 
The result on Tobin’s Q actually is consistent with Wei and Yermack (2010)’s find. In 
Wei and Yermack(2010), they find an overall destruction of enterprise value when a 
CEO’s deferred compensation holdings are large. 
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TABLE 23: Regression Results of Firm Performance 
 RET ROA Tobin’s Q 
Log(sales) -0.0052 0.0232*** -0.1160*** 
 (-0.84) (7.74) (-3.87) 
Leverage -0.2405*** -0.0127 -0.4960*** 
 (-6.37) (-0.69) (-2.68) 
TOP5_HLD -0.0043*** 0.0005 -0.0304*** 
 (-5.37) (1.33) (-7.68) 
SEG_NUM -0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0016 
 (-0.07) (-1.39) (-0.11) 
R&D/total assets 0.0114 -0.1096*** 0.7727*** 
 (0.83) (-16.37) (11.51) 
Assets in place 0.039*** 0.0373*** -0.2336*** 
 (2.28) (5.36) (-3.42) 
Board size 0.0178 -0.0495*** -0.2403 
 (0.5) (-2.87) (-1.39) 
OUT_PCT -0.1634** -0.0369 -0.0220 
 (-2.14) (-0.99) (-0.06) 
CEO tenure 0.0012 0.0006 0.0055 
 (1.13) (1.12) (1.09) 
CEO PPS 0.0024 -0.0046 -0.0303 
 (0.29) (-1.17) (-0.77) 
CEO cash pay 6.1742** -2.1725 7.5659 
 (2.2) (-1.58) (0.55) 
DCP return dummy 0.0217** 0.0136 0.0978 
 (2.79) (1.59) (1.35) 
DCP dummy -0.002 -0.0080 -0.1752** 
 (-0.11) (-0.97) (-2.12) 
Obs# 1333 1333 1333 
R-Squared 0.0656 0.2339 0.1797 
Note: 
OLS regression estimates of performance for a sample of S&P 1500 companies over 2006 to 
2009. To avoid the clustering effect, I take the mean of each variable for each case across time 
and running regression on the collapsed dataset of means. See Table 17 for the definition of 
the variables. T-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. Significant at 1% (***), 
5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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TABLE 24: Regression Results of Stock Performance, by Year 
 2007 2008 2009 
Log(sales) 0.014 -0.016** -0.067*** 
 (1.63) (-2.39) (-2.75) 
R&D/total assets 0.079 -0.002 0.026 
 (1.58) (-0.27) (0.5) 
Leverage -0.237*** -0.179*** 0.248 
 (-3.88) (-4.12) (1.37) 
TOP5_HLD -0.650*** -0.568*** 0.550 
 (-4.92) (-5.87) (1.55) 
SEG_NUM 0.015*** -0.014*** -0.025** 
 (2.94) (-3.6) (-1.81) 
Board size -0.074 0.043 0.245 
 (-1.32) (1.00) (1.51) 
OUT_PCT 0.382*** -0.027 -1.027*** 
 (2.95) (-0.26) (-2.67) 
Assets in place 0.031 -0.054*** 0.079 
 (1.08) (-2.59) (1.09) 
CEO PPS 0.0022 0.0076 -0.0033 
 (0.07) (0.14) (-0.24) 
CEO cash pay 15.09*** 3.451 46.62*** 
 (3.16) (1.35) (2.64) 
RET_LAG 0.046 -0.072*** -1.284*** 
 (1.51) (-3.97) (-13.37) 
DCP return dummy 0.045 0.046** -0.182** 
 (1.42) (1.92) (-1.95) 
DCP dummy -0.049* 0.020 0.081 
 (-1.8) (0.95) (1.07) 
Obs# 1454 1460 1413 
R-Squared 0.0532 0.0643 0.1414 
Note: 
OLS regression estimates of performance for a sample of S&P 1500 companies over 2007 to 
2009. See Table 17 for the definition of the variables. RET_LAG is one year lagged stock 
return. T-statistics appear in parentheses below each estimate. Significant at 1% (***), 5% 
(**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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4.2.4 Risk-Averse or Smart 
Questions may be raised regarding the validity of my proxy of risk-averse CEOs. 
Because it is very possible that CEOs who enjoy positive return on DCPs are smarter 
than others in ways such as they predicted the financial crisis or they are better in 
picking up mutual funds. To distinguish one from the other, I conduct a univariate 
analysis on CEOs’ return on DCPs. Here I exclude the firms without DCP plans. I 
compare the return on DCP of these two groups in different years. Table 25 shows that, 
except for year 2008, CEOs in group one consistently have lower return on deferrals 
for the other years. This suggests that CEOs in group one are at least not smarter than 
CEOs in group zero and therefore the representativeness of CEO_RISK for risk 
aversion is valid. 
TABLE 25: Comparison of Groups with Different CEO Risk Preference 
  Group0    Group1  
 Mean Std Median  Mean Std Median 
2009 20.37 31.46 18.70  4.69 14.31 3.86 
2008 -25.78 15.65 -25.76  6.89 9.28 4.80 
2007 6.41 18.58 5.82  5.51 9.45 5.58 
2006 10.73 9.62 10.46  7.12 5.39 6.71 
Obs# 662    227   
Note: 
Group0 is a set of firms having negative return on DCP in 2008 and group one is a set of firms 
having positive return of DCP in 2008 
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4.2.5 Selection Bias Adjusted Estimates 
In my sample, about 32% of the firms do not offer CEO deferred compensation plans.  
As Table 21 shows, a majority of the sample characteristics is significantly different 
between firms with deferred compensation plan and firms without it. In particular, 
firms with deferred compensation plan are likely to be larger in total assets, more 
business segments, more tangible assets, higher leverage ratios and larger board size 
compared to firms without deferred compensation plans. In addition, CEOs with 
deferred compensation plans seem more paid in cash and higher pay-for-performance 
sensitivity.  These observations motivate additional tests of whether my main results 
are significantly affected by a firm’s decision to require a CEO’s deferred 
compensation plan. 
In order to avoid sample selection problem, I estimate a maximum-likelihood 
version of the Heckman (1979) selection model. To model the firm’s deferred 
compensation plan decision in a general statistical framework, I adopt important 
determinants of having deferred compensation plan from Chapter one and Table 21 in 
this Chapter. These potential determinants lead to the following sample-selection 
model: 
Stage One: (DCP_Dummy)it = Ln(SALES)it +LEVERAGEit + GROWTHit + TOBINSQit +Zit 
Stage Two: (Volatility or Performance)it = Ln(SALES)it +LEVERAGEit + GROWTHit + 
TOBINSQit + CEO_Riskit +Xit 
 
In stage one, I include some CEO characteristics such as CEO age, CEO-
Chairman duality, Founder CEO dummy and Outside CEO dummy. Stage two is 
similar to the model in section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 but excludes the DCP dummy. 
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Table 26 and Table 27 present the estimates of the Heckman selection model. To 
make sure the model is identified, I include CEO age, CEO-Chair duality, Founder 
CEO dummy and CEO hired outside dummy in the first stage of the Probit regression 
(see column (1), (3), and (5)). As indicated in the last row, the hypothesis of no 
correlation of the error terms (ρ = 0) is not rejected in Table 26, suggesting that the 
sample selection is not a serious issue. However Table 27 suggests that the sample 
selection problem may be critical in estimating the firm performance. From the results 
of first stage, I find that larger firm, larger board size, higher percentage of 
independent directors are associated with higher likelihood of offering deferred 
compensation plans. Firms with lower Tobin’s Q and larger tangible assets are also 
more likely to offer deferred compensation plans to their CEOs. In addition, I find that 
firms are less likely to offer deferred compensation plans to their founder CEOs. 
Consistent with the results in Chapter one, I still do not find evidence of that deferred 
compensation decision is associated with firm leverage level.  Overall, the results in 
the fist stage of selection model suggest that powerful CEOs, weak board are 
associated with less likelihood of offering deferred compensation plans.  
From column (2), (4) and (6) of Table 26 and Table 27, I find that the main 
results do not change after controlling for selection bias. Comparing to Table 16, the 
only difference is that CEO_risk dummy losses its impact on stock return volatility 
after adjusting the sample selection bias, but it still show significant impact on ROA 
volatility and the volatility of asset value. Regarding the impact on performance, the 
results show even stronger significance after controlling for selection bias. Table 27 
shows that the coefficients of CEO_risk dummy for all three models are significantly 
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positive. This suggests that firms with risk-averse CEOs perform better during my 
research period (which is around the financial crisis) than firms with risk-taking CEOs. 
Overall, the results of Heckman selection model indicate that the evidence of risk 
aversion CEOs resulting in less firm performance volatility is robust to sample 
selection bias. Moreover, the results provide strong evidence of that firms with risk-
averse CEOs perform better in bad market than their counterparts. 
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TABLE 26: Heckman Selection Model Estimates for Performance Volatility 
 Selection VarRET Selection VarROA Selection AssetVol 
Intercept -1.024*** -0.512 -1.031*** -5.690 -1.006*** 3.941*** 
 (-6.68) (-0.2) (-6.13) (-1.57) (-6.7) (6.18) 
Tobin’s Q -0.029*** -0.029 -0.023** 0.154** -0.031*** -0.041*** 
 (-2.58) (-0.6) (-1.96) (2.38) (-2.62) (-3.19) 
Log(sales) 0.091*** -0.043 0.095*** -0.201 0.091*** -0.025 
 (9.91) (-0.36) (9.59) (-1.18) (9.94) (-0.84) 
Leverage 0.077 0.221 0.089 -0.673* 0.077 -0.234*** 
 (1.22) (0.83) (1.35) (-1.87) (1.22) (-3.18) 
TOP5_HLD 0.002 0.014*** 0.002* 0.031*** 0.002* 0.004*** 
 (1.56) (2.7) (1.59) (4.35) (1.63) (2.58) 
SEG_NUM 0.002 0.011 0.004 0.080*** 0.002 0.007 
 (0.43) (0.62) (0.82) (3.06) (0.46) (1.45) 
R&D/total assets -0.031 1.493** -0.021 3.316*** -0.029 0.527*** 
 (-1.29) (2.3) (-0.89) (3.98) (-1.28) (3.06) 
Board size 0.298*** -0.605 0.266*** -1.029** 0.298*** -0.126 
 (5.11) (-1.4) (4.24) (-1.89) (5.1) (-1.14) 
OUT_PCT 0.214* -1.321** 0.265* 0.234 0.214* -0.166 
 (1.61) (-2.08) (1.89) (0.26) (1.61) (-0.98) 
CEO tenure 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.009 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.47) (-0.6) (0.91) (1.2) (0.49) (-0.51) 
Assets in place 0.078*** -0.082 0.127*** 0.397 0.077*** 0.113*** 
 (2.72) (-0.56) (4.06) (1.48) (2.71) (2.9) 
CEO AGE 0.001  0.001  0.001  
 (0.74)  (0.71)  (0.69)  
CEO Duality 0.034  0.031  0.038*  
 (1.43)  (0.92)  (1.73)  
FOUNDER -0.108***  -0.112***  -0.111***  
 (-3.29)  (-3.26)  (-3.38)  
OUTSIDE -0.006  0.004  -0.015  
 (-0.22)  (0.15)  (-0.62)  
CEO PPS  0.575  -2.241  -0.347 
  (0.19)  (-0.59)  (-0.44) 
CEO cash pay  10.953  30.738  -1.209 
  (0.7)  (1.49)  (-0.29) 
DCP return dum  -0.088  -0.251**  -0.041* 
  (-0.94)  (-2.04)  (-1.62) 
Obs. No.  1330  1248  1330 
Log pseudo- 
likelihood 
 
-2085  -2121  -862.5 
P value of Wald 
test of exogeneity 
 0.698  0.999  0.136 
 
  110 
TABLE 26: Heckman Selection Model Estimates for Performance Volatility (continue) 
 
Note: This table presents the selection adjusted estimates using an MLE version of the 
Heckman (1979) selection model to examine the impact of CEO risk aversion on firm 
performance volatility. The dependent variables of the second stage regressions are Variance 
of Stock Return (column (2)), Variance of ROA (column (4)) and Asset Value Volatility 
(column (6)). Corresponding first stage of selection regression estimates are shown in column 
(1), (3) and (5) respectively. All other variables are defined in the Table 17. All results are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the test of White (1980). T-statistics are shown in the 
square brackets. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively, based 
on a two-tailed test.  
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TABLE 27: Heckman Selection Model Estimates for Firm Performance 
 Selection RET Selection ROA Selection Tobin’s Q 
Intercept -0.960*** 1.921*** -1.145*** -0.282 -1.128*** -1.128 
 (-6.63) (3.98) (-8.14) (-1.04) (-7.96) (-0.4) 
Log(sales) 0.091*** -0.052** 0.093*** 0.029** 0.095*** 0.201 
 (10.01) (-2.29) (10.24) (2.27) (10.36) (1.49) 
Leverage 0.076 -0.27*** 0.078 -0.021 0.079 -0.236 
 (1.2) (-4.68) (1.23) (-0.82) (1.24) (-1) 
TOP5_HLD 0.002* -0.007** 0.002* -0.001* 0.002* -0.011** 
 (1.61) (-2.35) (1.66) (-1.63) (1.62) (-2.33) 
SEG_NUM 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.48) (0.14) (0.36) (-0.88) (0.31) (-0.42) 
R&D/total assets -0.029 -0.132 -0.031 0.015 -0.031 2.556*** 
 (-1.26) (-1.12) (-1.3) (0.35) (-1.3) (5.96) 
Board size 0.298*** -0.127 0.302*** 0.024 0.301*** 0.305 
 (5.11) (-1.5) (5.17) (0.55) (5.13) (0.66) 
OUT_PCT 0.214* 0.074 0.229* 0.078 0.235* 0.390 
 (1.61) (0.56) (1.72) (1.3) (1.76) (0.67) 
CEO tenure 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 -0.007 
 (0.74) (0.51) (-0.17) (0.04) (0.15) (-1.37) 
Assets in place 0.078*** 0.019 0.083*** 0.063*** 0.085*** 0.106 
 (2.74) (0.62) (2.89) (4.11) (2.95) (0.69) 
CEO AGE 0.0002  0.002* 0.064 0.002*  
 (0.15)  (1.93) (0.31) (1.61)  
CEO Duality 0.038**  0.013 0.879 -0.003  
 (1.94)  (0.7) (0.8) (-0.15)  
FOUNDER -0.113***  -0.055 0.011* -0.061  
 (-3.59)  (-1.48) (1.61) (-1.49)  
OUTSIDE -0.018  0.035**  0.033*  
 (-0.88)  (2)  (1.79)  
CEO PPS  -0.192  0.064  1.961 
  (-0.35)  (0.31)  (0.98) 
CEO cash pay  5.823**  0.879  7.323 
  (2.01)  (0.80)  (0.7) 
DCP return dum  0.049***  0.011*  0.132** 
  (2.85)  (1.61)  (2.12) 
Obs. No.  1330  1330  1330 
Log pseudo- 
likelihood 
 
-539.59  354.4  -1717 
P value of Wald 
test of exogeneity 
 0.0003  <.0001  0.0007 
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TABLE 27: Heckman Selection Model Estimates for Firm Performance (continue) 
 
Note: This table presents the selection adjusted estimates using an MLE version of the 
Heckman (1979) selection model to examine the impact of CEO risk aversion on firm 
performance. The dependent variables of the second stage regressions are Stock Return 
(column (2)), ROA (column (4)) and Tobin’s Q (column (6)). Corresponding first stage of 
selection regression estimates are shown in column (1), (3) and (5) respectively. All other 
variables are defined in the Table 17. All results are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the 
test of White (1980). T-statistics are shown in the square brackets. ***, **, * represent 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
Schooley and Worden (1996) argue that personal portfolio allocations (measured as 
risky assets to wealth) are reliable indicators of attitudes toward risk. In response to 
critics of weak relation, endogeneity and identification problems in previous literature 
in the study of managerial risk aversion and firm risk/performance, I turn to look for 
exogenous variables that can reflect CEO’s current risk aversion. The 2008 financial 
crisis provides a unique opportunity to boil down the portfolio allocation of CEO 
personal investment in DCPs into risky investment and riskless investment. By 
looking at the return of DCP in 2008, I will be able to separate the CEOs into two 
groups: risk-averse CEOs and risk-taking CEOs. 
Using this novel proxy of CEO risk aversion, I provide new evidence on the 
relationship between CEO risk preference and the volatility of firm performance. I 
also find that firms providing DCP plans to CEOs have lower performance volatility. 
After controlling for sample selection bias, I find that firms with risk-averse CEOs 
have relatively lower market performance volatility. My results show firms with risk-
averse CEOs perform better than other firms in terms of stock return, ROA and 
Tobin’s Q after selection bias adjustment. Further examination of stock return shows 
that the positive correlation is mainly driven by year 2008. This suggests that risk-
averse CEOs may lead firms to perform better than others in a down market. However, 
in good years this correlation is not significant. I do not find evidence of firms with 
DCPs performing better than those without DCPs. Instead, I find that firms with DCPs 
have lower Tobin’s Q than other firms. This result is consistent with Wei and 
Yermack (2010)’s findings. Wei and Yermack(2010) find an overall destruction of 
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enterprise value when a CEO’s deferred compensation holdings are large. 
This study makes four main contributions. First, it is the first empirical study that 
uses natural experiment data to examine the CEO risk preference and firm risk relation. 
Previous studies in this field largely omitted the natural experiment method. Second, it 
is also the first empirical study that documents the return data of CEO deferred 
compensation investment. Third, it provides supportive evidence of firms with risk-
averse CEOs have lower firm risk and higher firm performance in bad market. Four, it 
shows that firms with inside debt compensation have lower firm risk and lower firm 
market value. 
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